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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
South Africa, among others, has adopted, and is bound by, the so-called ‗rule in Hollington‘1 
that originated in England in 1943 in Hollington v Hewthorn (hereinafter the ‗Hollington 
case‘).2 The issue, among others, that the English Appeal Court had to determine in this case 
was whether a judgement of a criminal court could be used in subsequent civil proceedings to 
prove the liability of either of the litigants. The Court reached the conclusion that a judgement 
of a criminal court is just an irrelevant and inadmissible opinion in later civil proceedings. 
The court adopted the view that had a criminal conviction been admissible evidence in civil 
proceedings, it would lead to a situation where the defendant would end up challenging the 
propriety of those convictions. In the light of that, the courts would be faced with a duty to 
retry the criminal case in the midst of the civil proceedings.
3
 
Section 17 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act (CPEA)
 4
 provides that a conviction or an 
acquittal can be proved by the production of a document dully certified by the relevant court 
that acquitted or convicted the person in question. Furthermore, section 18 of the Supreme 
Court Act (SuCA)
5
 now section 34 of the Superior Courts Act (SupCA)
6
 provides that 
whenever a judgement, among other things, of a court needs to be proved or referred to in 
any manner a duly certified copy thereof will serve as prima facie evidence thereof. These 
sections militate against the rule in Hollington in that they allow, or at least should be 
interpreted in a manner that accords with the allowance of, the admissibility of conviction 
evidence in later civil law suits. 
                                                            
1 Yusaf v Bailey 1964 (4) SA 117 (W); See also Birkett v Accident Fund 1964 (1) SA 561 (T) where the SA 
courts held themselves to be bound by the English judgement, the Hollington case. 
2 Hollington v Hewthorn 2 [1943] All ER 35. 
3 Hollington case at 40 A – E. 
4 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s17. – ‗The trial and conviction or acquittal of any person may be 
proved by the production of a document certified or purporting to be certified by the registrar or clerk of the 
court or other officer having the custody of the records of the court where such conviction or acquittal took 
place, or by the deputy of such registrar, clerk or other officer, to be a copy of the record of the charge and of the 
trial, conviction and judgment or acquittal, as the case may be, omitting the formal parts thereof.‘ 
5 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 18. 
6 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, s 34. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The judiciary, including the highest court of the land, has despite the existence of section 17 
of the CPEA and section 34 of the SupCA, cited the rule in Hollington confirming that it is 
part of our law.
7
 The South African courts seem to place much reliance on section 42 of the 
CPEA, the so called ‗residuary section‘, in isolation of section 17 of the CPEA. According to 
section 42, the courts are entrusted with a duty to apply the law of evidence pertaining to civil 
proceedings that was in force on the 30 May 1961. On that date South Africa followed, and 
was bound by, the English law that included the Hollington case and the rule laid down 
therein.
8
 Section 42 makes it clear that only and only when the CPEA is silent on a matter will 
the courts be entitled to seek answers from the jurisprudence that applied on 30 May 1961. 
The wording of section 42 is peremptory in that it employs the word ‗shall‘ and not ‗may‘, 
therefore from this it is clear that this section is not applicable at the judges‘ discretion. From 
the wording of the CPEA, section 42 will not be functional in cases where a matter has 
already been catered for by other CPEA provisions, not even at judges‘ discretion. To date the 
judiciary still employs section 42 to seek answers elsewhere even though section 17 is already 
in place and is providing the answers on the admissibility of conviction evidence in civil 
matters and this will be  discussed extensively in chapter 3 of this dissertation. In addition, 
courts continue to ventilate the rule in Hollington by further extending its application to 
tribunal proceedings.
9
 That state of affairs is controversial
10
 and needlessly contributes to 
litigation costs.
11
 This dissertation seeks to resolve the problem that ought to have ended in 
1965 when the legislature took the initiative and enacted the CPEA including section17 that 
abolished the rule in Hollington.
                                                            
7 Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC) para 42. 
8 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s42. – ‗The law of evidence including the law relating to the 
competency, compellability, examination and cross-examination of witnesses which was in force in respect of 
civil proceedings on the thirtieth day of May, 1961, shall apply in any case not provided for by this Act or any 
other law.‘ 
9 Graham v Park Mews Body Corporate and Another [2012] 1 All SA 167 (WCC) para 60; De Sousa and 
Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others [2017] 3 All SA 47 (GJ) para 
107. 
10 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others [1995] 2 All SA 543 (A) para 556. 
11 Cross Evidence 3ed (1967) 378. 
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1.2 Objective of the Study 
This dissertation seeks to argue for the abolition of the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn relying 
on the legal developments in the jurisdiction from which it was derived. The intent is to show 
how it militates against the relevant prescripts of the CPEA. An analysis of case law will be 
embarked on in the exploration of the problem.  
1.3 The Significance of the Problem 
The rule in Hollington has been applied by courts in South Africa despite the effects it could 
have and has had on litigants.
12
 Before examining the effect of this rule in the South African 
setting, it is necessary to consider its effect it had in the first case in which it was formulated, 
the Hollington case. In that case an action for damages emanating from a motor vehicle 
collision was instituted subsequent to a criminal case in which the court declared the driver to 
have been negligent. The father (plaintiff) of the deceased (victim) instituted a civil action for 
damages resulting from the death of his son who died from the sustained injuries. The 
plaintiff had no direct evidence to prove negligence on the part of the driver and he then 
tendered the criminal court judgement in which the driver had been convicted of negligent 
driving following the accident. The court of first instance rejected that evidence on the basis 
that it was opinion evidence, which enjoyed inadmissibility in proving negligence in 
subsequent civil proceedings. On appeal, the Appeal Court upheld the court a quo‘s finding.13 
As is evident from the above, the application of this rule in that specific instance caused 
considerable prejudice to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had no other evidence to tender to prove 
that the driver, as a result of whose driving the plaintiff‘s child had died, had been negligent 
apart from the initial criminal court‘s judgement. The rule in Hollington resulted in unfair and 
unreasonable jeopardy to the plaintiff‘s claim as the court disregarded the conviction.14 
When the rule was subsequently received into South African law, it was similarly prejudicial 
to litigants. When plaintiffs wanted to recover their losses that resulted from theft, the civil 
courts ruled that the fact that a defendant had been convicted of theft by a criminal court was 
irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings in proving that such 
                                                            
12 Graham v Park Mews Body Corporate and Another; 2012 (1) SA 355 (WCC); [2012] 1 All SA 167 (WCC) 
para 60; De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others [2017] 
3 All SA 47 (GJ) para 107. 
13 Hollington v Hewthorn 2 [1943] All ER 35. 
14 Zeffertt DT & Paizes The South African Evidence 2 ed (2009) 342. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
4 
 
defendant had in fact commit theft.
15
 This rule also affects the plaintiffs‘ claims in cases of 
pecuniary loss and in cases of defamation. The court in the case of defamation held that a 
convicted party could not be liable for fraud in the subsequent civil action for fraud merely 
based on the reliance by the plaintiff on such initial criminal conviction.
16
 A perpetuated 
application of the rule in Hollington by the South African courts after the birth of section 17 
of the CPEA in South Africa poses a difficulty for litigants that have no any other better 
evidence than the criminal court judgement itself. Litigants are deprived of the use as 
evidence of judgements have been arrived at by the criminal courts after due consideration of 
all relevant factors surrounding the case as presented to them. The rule will compel prolonged 
litigation as new evidence is required to prove the same matter that the criminal courts have 
already pronounced on. That state of affairs completely disregards the cost litigation. 
The principle of stare decisis is a Latin term that translates ‗to stand by things decided‘. In the 
legal context, it translates to: that the decisions made by courts must be followed by other 
courts as well in subsequent proceedings when they have been approached to determine 
similar issues.
17
 The importance of this principle is that it promotes legal certainty and 
consistency. Furthermore, it promotes reliance on court rulings and also signifies the integrity 
of the court process.
18
 
The doctrine of judicial precedent prescribes that the courts should uphold the law as 
articulated in previous judgements of the superior, courts and their own decisions. However, a 
court may deviate from decisions of courts of similar status or its own decisions if it can 
demonstrate that they were erroneously decided.
19
 This doctrine originated in, and was 
derived from, the English law and it is founded on the notion that the law that was applied to a 
specific situation previously should likewise be applied in similar situations thereafter. It is 
                                                            
15 R v Xaki 1950 (4) SA 332 (E); R v Lee 1952 (2) SA 67 (T); R v Markins Motors(pty) Ltd 1959 (3)  SA 508; 
Du Toit v Grobler 1947 (3) SA 588 (SWA). 
16 Yusuf v Baily (1964) SA 117 (W). 
17Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re: S v Walters and Another 2002 (7) BCLR 663 
(C) at 693. 
18 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Resident Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC); 
see also Legal Information Institute ‗Stare Decisis‘ available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis 
(Accessed 21 February 2018). 
19  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re: S v Walters and Another 2002 (7) BCLR 663 
(C) at 693 . 
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essentially ingrained in the principle of stare decisis and is expressive of the fact that the 
courts are ordered in a hierarchical fashion.
20
 
1.3.1 Conflict with Judicial Precedent and Stare Decisis 
The rule in Hollington unreasonably interferes with and militates against stare decisis and 
judicial precedent, the long-standing principles that serve a legitimate purpose in our law. The 
Hollington rule unreasonably puts these principles in abeyance. This translates to: that even if 
the High Court convicts an accused person as charged, such conviction is not binding on the 
inferior courts, such as a Magistrate‘s Court, although it would otherwise be binding in terms 
of the judicial precedent principle. The rule in Hollington entitles a Magistrate to disregard 
that conviction on the basis that it is irrelevant and therefore is inadmissible in a subsequent 
civil suit.
21
 This rule entitles the inferior courts to the exercise of powers that were legally 
never given to them. It also does away with legal certainty and consistency, and takes away 
from litigants a reliance on, judicial precedent, and tempers with perceived and actual 
integrity of the court process. This position would lead to a situation where a litigant is 
made to feel as having been unjustly treated as the 
initial judgement applicable to their case was not considered although the facts were 
materially the same.
22
 
1.3.2 Conflict with Common Sense 
It is a long-standing fundamental principle of South African law that in criminal matters 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the required standard. The Appellate Division (now the 
SCA) in the case of S v Mlambo held that it is sufficient for the State to produce evidence by 
means of which such a high degree of probability is raised that the ordinary reasonable man, 
after mature consideration, concludes that there exists no unreasonable doubt that an accused 
has committed the crime with which he is charged.
23
 Having outlined the criminal law 
standard of proof, it is similarly essential to deliberate on the civil law standard in order to 
juxtapose between them because the rule in Hollington tends to disregard their hierarchical 
order. In civil proceedings, the required standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. 
                                                            
20 Barratt A & Snyman P ‗Researching South African Law‘ Available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa1.html#_edn14 (Accessed 23 February 2018). 
21  Groenewald N.O and Another v Swanepoel 2002 (6) SA 724 (E) page 727E. 
22 Halho HR & Khan E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 244. 
23 S v Mlambo 1957 (4) SA 727 (A) page 738A-B. 
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This, according to the Appellate Division in Pillay v Krishna, translates to a duty upon 
litigants to adduce evidence to combat a prima facie case made by the opponent litigant.
24
 
It is, or at least should be, clear from the two foregoing explanations that in criminal matters 
the standard of proof is heavier than it is in civil proceedings. This is so because in criminal 
matters the State is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while, 
on the other hand, in civil proceedings the litigants are only required to show a prima facie 
case against each other. The rule in Hollington requires the matter to be started afresh in the 
civil proceedings and to be proved on a balance of probabilities, a standard which is lighter 
than the one on which the matter was first proved in the criminal court. This state of affairs 
militates against logic and common sense as it is irreconcilable to trade a stronger standard of 
proof for the lighter one.   
1.3.3 Conflict with De Bloedige Hand  Neemt Geen Erf Enis rule 
The doctrine of de bloedige hand neemt geen erf enis (hereinafter the ‗bloedige hand 
doctrine‘) is a Roman-Dutch law derived principle that forms part of South African common 
law.
25
 It translates to: that a murder makes the murderer unworthy to inherit from the 
deceased‘s estate, and thus serves to prevent murderers from benefitting from their criminal 
undertakings.
26
 In Danielz NO v De Wet
27
 the first respondent (the wife) was married to the 
deceased (the husband) and was the sole nominated beneficiary of the life insurance policies 
taken out on the life of the deceased. The wife hired a person to assault the deceased and 
subsequent to, and in consequence of, that assault the husband died. The criminal court found 
both the direct and indirect perpetrators guilty of murder. The administrators of the deceased‘s 
estate brought a civil suit to have the wife excluded as a beneficiary in terms of the bloedige 
hand doctrine. It was argued on behalf of the errant spouse that a criminal court conviction is, 
in terms of the Hollington rule (which is English-law derived principle equally forming part 
of the South African law), inadmissible in later civil suits. Traverso AJP upheld that 
argument.
28
 
                                                            
24 Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 page 952. 
25 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C). 
26 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C) para 37; see 
also Ex parte Steenkamp and Steenkamp 1952 (1) SA 744 (T) at 752GH for more grounds upon which a person 
will be deemed unworthy to inherit. 
27 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C). 
28 Danielz NO case para 17-18. 
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The rule in Hollington stands out to compete and conflict with the common law doctrine of 
bloedige hand which doctrine serves to advance the legitimate demands of public policy. The 
Hollington rule defeats the bloedige hand and renders it useless in that it makes it difficult for 
it to achieve the very purpose for which it was intended. Put differently, the Hollington rule 
presents itself as an obstacle to the bloedige hand doctrine. In future it will be difficult for the 
courts to render the litigants unworthy to inherit on the basis of their misdeeds because the 
rule in Hollington forces them to turn a blind eye on the pronouncements of the criminal 
courts.  
1.3.4 Conflict with Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The doctrine of the separation of powers, also known as trias politica, denotes that State 
power is divided among three spheres of government. Had the State power been bestowed on 
only one government authority, that would have led to an abuse of power.
29
 That abuse of 
power is prevented by a split of governmental authorities into legislative, executive and 
judicial authorities which are exercised by different government units.
30
 The legislative 
authority denotes the power to enact, amend and repeal legislation and is conferred on the 
parliament. The judicial authority, on the other hand, has the power to determine what the law 
is and apply it to disputes.
31
 
The legislature decided to exercise its legislative authority in 1965 by enacting the CPEA, 
coming with it section 17 that allowed as admissible proof a conviction and/or an acquittal as 
reflected in the judgements of the criminal courts.  Be that as it may, the courts decided to 
disregard that valid legislation and assumed the legislative authority by imposing on litigants 
the rule in Hollington. This can be seen as an intrusion by the judiciary into the domain of the 
legislature in that it constitutes a breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Alternatively, 
the courts are misinterpreting the CPEA as long as they disregard section 17 thereof in favour 
of section 42, which permits the incorporation of English law only and only when the CPEA 
is silent on the particular evidential matter at hand. 
1.4 The Research Questions 
In the light of the above problems, the important questions are: What does section 17 of the 
CPEA mean and require of the courts to do insofar as judgement evidence in later civil suits is 
                                                            
29 Rautenbach IM Rautenbach-Malherbe Constitutional Law 6ed (2012) 59. 
30 Rautenbach IM Rautenbach-Malherbe Constitutional Law, page 59. 
31 Rautenbach IM Rautenbach-Malherbe Constitutional Law, page 59. 
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concerned? What is the actual or perceived effect of section 17 in relation to the rule in 
Hollington? Is the prolongation of the rule in Hollington by the courts despite the prescripts of 
section 17 of the CPEA not defeating, or at least tampering with, a valid legislative 
enactment? Does section 42 of the CPEA apply in isolation of, or override, section 17?  
Moreover, if a criminal court judgement in later civil proceedings is hearsay evidence because 
its probative value depends on the credibility of the criminal court judge who is not present to 
testify in the civil court, then why it is not admitted as an exception in terms of section 3 (1) 
(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (LEAA)?
32
  What are, and should be, the 
implications of a stronger standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) on the ―not-so-
strong‖ standard of proof (balance of probabilities) in South African jurisprudence? This 
dissertation is essentially a rigorous exploration of these questions and will further contribute 
solutions that our courts may take into account when they are tempted to further perpetuate 
the Hollington rule that was criticised as being controversial.
33
 
1.5 Proposed Arguments  
This dissertation argues that it is now high time for the courts to reconsider the rule in the 
Hollington. It must be accepted that after it was laid down by the English Court of Appeal in 
1943 the South African courts applied it, and that was more than two decades before the birth 
of the CPEA in 1965.
34
 This means that before the South African legislature enacted the 
CPEA, South African courts were at liberty to apply the law taking into account the law as in 
England, a jurisdiction from which some of the South African common law derives.
35
 The 
CPEA was enacted in South Africa in 1965, including section 17 which, upon its enactment 
and still today, is clear, and contrary to and abolished the Hollington rule. The construction of 
section 17 is wide enough that it, when the literal approach to interpretation is employed, 
makes itself available to all the litigants whether or not they were parties to initial criminal 
proceedings.  
There exists no need for the enactment of new legislation to finally lay the rule in Hollington 
to rest because the CPEA is already clear on that. This dissertation argues that courts have 
various and divergent means by which to finally abolish the rule. If South African courts, for 
                                                            
32 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 s 3(1)(c). 
33  Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others [1995] 2 All SA 543 (A) page 556. 
34 Du Toit v Grobler 1947 (3) SA 588 (SWA); R v Xaki 1950 (4) SA 332 (E); R v Lee 1952 (2) SA 67 (T); R v 
Markins Motors(pty) Ltd 1959 (3)  SA 508. 
35 Barratt A et Snyman p ‗Researching South African Law‘ Available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa1.html#_edn14 (Accessed 23 February 2018). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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whatever reasons, give section 17 a different meaning than the one anticipated in this 
dissertation, then they can make use of the Constitution and develop the common law in terms 
of section 173 read with section 39(2).
36
 Section 39(2) bestows on the courts a power to 
develop the common law while, on the other hand section 173, explains the nature of that 
power and the courts anticipated to exercise it. Section 173 provides that it is a power inherent 
in the superior courts namely the High Court, the SCA and the Constitutional Court. The 
superior courts may, as an alternative to the use of section 17 of the CPEA, accept the duty to 
develop the common law using sections 173 and 39(2) of the Constitution by finally putting 
the rule in Hollington to rest. This is so because even in England, a jurisdiction where this rule 
originated, it was, following its criticism by the Law Reform Commission,
37
 abolished by the 
Civil Evidence Act.
38
  
Alternative to the use of section 17 of the CPEA and the development of the common law in 
terms of sections 173 and 39 (2) of the Constitution, there is another method that South 
African courts may use to properly deal with the rule in Hollington. Section 3 (4) of the 
LEAA defines hearsay as evidence whether in oral form or in writing whose probative value 
depends on the credibility of a person other than the one adducing it.
39
 The verdict of a 
criminal court judge being adduced as evidence by a litigant in later civil suits to prove guilt 
or innocence is hearsay because its probative value depends on the credibility of that criminal 
court judge and not the litigant that is adducing it now.
40
 It can therefore be argued that the 
judgement evidence complements and aligns with the prescripts of the LEAA, and if it does 
then its admissibility must be regulated in terms of the LEAA. As a general rule, hearsay 
evidence is not admissible both in criminal and civil proceedings.
41
  
An exception exists in terms of which hearsay evidence may, despite the general rule, be 
admissible when the courts are of the view that its admissibility is in the interest of justice.
42
 
The judgement evidence may therefore be admissible by way of that exception as being in the 
interest of justice because it is not in the interest of justice to ignore a decision that has been 
arrived at following the employment of a stronger standard of proof. Adjudicating afresh, but 
not on appeal, the matter that has already been decided militates against the principle of 
                                                            
36 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 39 (2) & 173. 
37 15th Report (The Rule in Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd) (1967)  Cmnd 3391, para 4. 
38 Civil Evidence Act 1968   s 11. 
39 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 s3(4) (Hereinafter ‗LEAA‘). 
40 Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited (1970) 87 SALJ 334. 
41 LEAA s 3 (1). 
42 LEAA s 3 (1) (c). 
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finality in litigation.
43
 The South African courts must now, in the light of the foregoing 
contributions, turn off the ventilator that has long been aiding the rule in Hollington in the era 
of section 17 of the CPEA. 
  
                                                            
43 Jordaan DW ‗Taking a Second Bite at the Appeal Cherry: Molaudzi v S’ (2016) 19 PER/PELJ 2. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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1.6 Literature Review 
Most legal scholars in South Africa have criticised the application of the rule in Hollington. 
They expressed an unwillingness to support this rule. They do acknowledge that it forms part 
of South African law and that the courts are accordingly bound by it. They are of the view that 
as long as section 42 of the CPEA exist this rule will continue to bind the courts to reject the 
judgement evidence in later civil proceedings. The writers are of the opinion that new 
legislation must be enacted in order to effectively deal with the rule in Hollington. 
Furthermore, some of the writers have made mention of section 17 of the CPEA but argued 
that this clause must not be interpreted in a manner that prevents the application of section 42 
and the rule in Hollington.
44
   
                                                            
44 Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe S Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) 313; See also Zeffertt DT & Paizes 
The South African Evidence 2ed (2009) 341 – 343; Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited‘ 
(1970) 87 SALJ 344 – 337; Davids J ‗Judgment as Evidence‘ (1968) 85 SALJ 78 -79. See further the 
contribution of made by the scholars from other jurisdiction that were similarly bound by the rule in Hollington: 
Spencer JR ‗The Ghost of The Rule In Hollington v Hewthorn Exorcist Required‘ (2014) 73 CLJ 477; Wright 
CA ‗Evidence-Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Civil Actions – Hearsay‘ (1943) 21 CBR 658. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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1.7 Chapter Outline 
 Chapter 2 will trace the history of the Hollington rule through the judicial precedent 
from birth to its development and abolition in the English legal system by the English 
legislature in terms of the Civil Evidence Act of 1968. 
 Chapter 3 will focus on the reception, application, and expansion of the Hollington 
rule in the South African legal system together with the difficulties it presented. 
 Chapter 4 will embark on a deep exploration of other jurisdictions; how they dealt 
with the judgement evidence; how they applied the rule and what were the 
shortcomings they had in the process and how they handled those shortcomings. 
 Chapter 5 will finally shed the light on the way forward in the South African context. 
To that end chapter five will consider among other things, the duties of the courts, 
prescripts of the CPEA and other legal instruments that are worth considering in this 
dissertation owing to their relevance. 
 
1.8. Methodology 
This dissertation uses South African law and further includes an analysis of foreign case law. 
This dissertation is not a rigorous comparative study, but it explores how other jurisdictions 
such as Wales, Canada, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand as they have dealt 
with the problem investigated in this work. Scholarly writings, such as articles and books are 
used as well as other instruments such as law commission reports.
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE BIRTH, DEVELOPMENT AND ABOLITION OF THE RULE IN 
HOLLINGTON IN ENGLAND, WHERE IT FIRST ORIGINATED 
2.1 Introduction 
The rule in Hollington has its origin in England. This chapter tracks the legal position of 
earlier criminal convictions in later civil suits in England before, and after the formulation of 
the rule in Hollington. This chapter will not end there but will also track the legal position 
subsequent to the formulation of this rule up until its abolition by the English Civil Evidence 
Act.
45
 The lines of reasoning furnished by the English courts in respect of this rule prior to, 
and after, its formulation are scrutinised to assess the impact they had on the English law and 
litigants at large. 
2.2 Admissibility of Convictions Prior to, the Hollington Rule 
Prior to the Hollington case there were cases in which the admissibility of previous 
convictions was favoured. Such cases were few prior to 1943, but subsequent to that year 
cases started to emerge, one of which deserves mention, namely Hill v Clifford.
46
 This case is 
said to not have been brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of England in 1943 where 
the Hollington rule was formulated, and that it has been virtually forgotten.
47
 In the Hill case, 
a judicial record, far less in status than a criminal court judgement, was admitted by the 
English Appeal Court. The General Medical Council, acting in terms of the authority of 
relevant legislation, made an order striking Clifford from the dental register on the ground that 
he was guilty of unprofessional conduct. Prior to the order, the plaintiff had entered into a 
partnership agreement with Clifford, whereby it was provided that the agreement could be 
terminated if any of the partners were guilty of unprofessional conduct. An action was 
commenced to decide the validity of an attempt to determine a fine on the basis of the 
Council's ruling, and in this action the question of the admissibility of the Council‘s order in 
subsequent civil proceedings was raised. 
                                                            
45 English Civil Evidence Act 1968. 
46 Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 Ch 236. 
47 Shymea E.R ‗Hollington v. Hewthorn In Canada‘ (1955) 1 ALR 174 at page 178; Cowen & Carter ‗Essays in 
the law of evidence‘ 1 ed (1956) 196. 
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There is one case that deserves mention, namely, Harvey v R,48 which was cited in the 
Hollington case did not have any binding effect on the Court of Appeal as it was decided by 
the Privy Council.49 In the Harvey case the matter was first adjudicated before a Master in 
Lunacy tribunal. The Master made an order pronouncing that the defendant was a person of 
unsound mind. Although the defendant was not found to be so through an inquiry, the Master 
authorised the defendant‘s wife to defend the action before him. The Master‘s view was later 
admitted by the Privy Council as evidence at face value of the actual defendant‘s mental 
incompetence. In arriving at that conclusion, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held 
that the Lunacy orders could not be rejected on the grounds that they were inadmissible. The 
Privy Council further held that Lunacy orders could also not be regarded as no evidence of the 
truthfulness of the facts reflected therein. Such orders were finally admitted as prima facie 
proof.
50
  
Subsequent to the Harvey case the Court of Appeal also upheld the Privy Council‘s order as 
prima facie evidence that misconduct had indeed been committed by the party that was found 
guilty thereof by the Privy Council.
51
 In Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd
52
 the Court 
developed a ‗discretion principle‘ according to which the Court of Appeal and the inferior 
courts of England were at liberty to exercise their discretion in deciding whether or not a 
previous conviction should be admissible in a particular case before them. In two other Court 
of Appeal cases, the previous convictions were admitted as proof of commission of the crime 
by the convicted person, and in both cases the issue of admissibility was never raised.
53
 
Furthermore, in Estate of Crippen
54
 a murder conviction was tendered as evidence that 
Crippen had murdered his wife. Evans J rejected previous precedent that was established in, 
and followed since, the 18
th
 century and allowed the conviction evidence as prima facie proof 
that Crippen was the murderer of his wife. In arriving at that conclusion the Court relied on 
                                                            
48 Harvey v R. [1901] A.C. 601 (P.C.). 
49 Willier v Joyce & Anr 2016 UKSC 43 - in this case the court clarified the legal effect of the Privy Council on 
other courts. The court held that the Privy Council‘s decisions are not binding on the courts in England and 
Wales. The court further held that those decisions have a persuasive value only to the House of Lords, Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal. 
50 Harvey v R. [1901] A.C. 601 (P.C.) page 611. 
51 Hill v Clifford [1907] 2 Ch 236. 
52 Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited ,[1944] 1 KB 71. 
53 Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund  Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147; Estate of Hall, Hall v Knight and Baxter 
[1941] P 1. 
54 Estate of Crippen [1911] P. 108. 
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the existing common law principle ‗omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta’55 in 
justifying the deviation from the long established precedent in favour of the admission of 
judgement evidence. The Judge concluded that the maxim res inter alios acta
56
 had no 
application to the facts before him. Subsequently, Crippen was followed in England in other 
cases including, Mash v Darly,
57
 Partington v Partington and Atkinson,
58
 O'Toolt v 
O'Toolt,
59
and Little v Little.60 Furthermore, in Smith v Selwyn61 the Court developed the rule 
according to which when the offence gave rise to both criminal and civil remedies then the 
civil remedies could not be pursued if the injury amounted to a felony until the criminal 
prosecution had been finalised.  
In a further case the ruling was contemporaneous with the Hollington case and therefore 
deserves mention in this dissertation. General Medical Council v Spackman
62
 may, to a 
certain extent, be regarded as an authority initially available to contradict the Hollington rule. 
In that case, Spackman, a registered medical practitioner, was found by the Matrimonial 
Court to be liable for adultery in the divorce proceedings. With this court record at hand, 
proceedings were instituted before the General Medical Council to adjudicate on whether 
Spackman‘s name should be struck off the medical practitioners‘ register. Spackman wanted 
to present new evidence that had not been presented in the divorce proceedings, but the 
Council rejected the admission of that evidence and then ordered that the name of the errant 
practitioner be removed from the said register. When that matter was taken to the King‘s 
Bench Division, the Court held that there had been no violation of natural justice. However, 
Singleton J dissented and the dissent hinged and relied on Partington v Partington and 
Atkinson
63
 to assert that a previous conviction or judicial record was admissible only as prima 
facie, and not as conclusive, evidence. Accordingly, held the Court, the General Medical 
Council had treated the divorce decree as conclusive evidence, which consequently meant 
that there had been a refusal of natural justice. Subsequent to that, the English Appeal Court 
                                                            
55 The omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta principle translates that once it is proved that an act has 
occurred in reliance on that act it will automatically be presumed that such act has indeed occurred until 
otherwise has been proven. (Law J ‗A Dictionary of Law‘ available at: 
www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199664924-e-2695 [Accessed 20 November 2018]). 
56 Principle which translates that ‗a thing done between others does not harm or benefit others‘. (see Estate of 
Crippen [1911] P. 108). 
57 Mash v Darly [1914] 1 K.B 1. 
58 Partington v Partington and Atkinson [1925) P. 34. 
59 O'Toolt v O'Toolt (1926), 42 T. L. R, 24. 
60 Little v Little [1927] P. 224. 
61 Smith v Selwyn [1914] 3 K.B. 98, C.A. 
62 General Medical Council v Spackman [1943] A.C. 627. 
63 Partington v Partington and Atkinson [1925) P. 34. 
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and the House of Lords supported the dissenting judgement by Singleton J. It has been argued 
by some scholars that the support of Singleton J‘s dissenting judgement did, or at least 
should, not mean that criminal court judgements could be admitted as sufficient proof in later 
civil law suits. The reason for that is that had that been the case the judgements would have 
spelled it out clearly and explicitly.
64
 
2.3 Admissibility of Previous Convictions Subsequent to the Hollington Case 
For the sake of completeness and consistency I will give a short outline of the case in which 
the principle that a previous conviction cannot serve as proof of that fact in later civil law 
suits was established. In Hollington v F Hewtorn & Co Ltd, legal action for damages resulting 
from a collision of vehicles was instituted subsequent to a criminal case in which the Court 
declared the driver to have been negligent. The plaintiff, who was the father of the deceased 
who died from injuries sustained, had no direct evidence to prove negligence on the part of 
the driver, and he then tendered the criminal court judgement in which the driver had been 
convicted of negligent driving following the collision. The court of first instance rejected that 
evidence and then went on to regard it as opinion evidence, which enjoyed no admissibility in 
proving negligence in subsequent civil proceedings. For the same reasons the Appeal Court 
similarly rejected that evidence on the same line of reasoning.
 65
 
Goddard J then arrived at the conclusion that the judgement of a criminal court becomes a 
mere opinion of that court and is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in subsequent civil 
proceedings.
66
 The learned Judge went on to hold that a judgement of a criminal court does 
not amount to an estoppel in subsequent civil proceedings.
67
 The Court further held that the 
reason for that hinged on the fact that had the evidence of the criminal court been admitted as 
relevant in subsequent civil proceedings, then that could lead to a situation where the 
defendant challenged the propriety of that conviction. It was held further that the courts 
would then be faced with a duty to repeat the criminal case, which had already been decided, 
in order to determine the extent of the weight to be attributed to that outcome.
68
 
The Hollington case set precedent that was subsequently followed in Hinds v Sparks, Hinds 
had been prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of robbery. Hinds then appealed to the 
                                                            
64 Cowen & Carter ‗Essays in the law of evidence‘ 1 ed (1956) 196. 
65 Hollington v F Hewtorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587, [1943] 2 All ER 35 (CA). 
66 Hollington v F Hewtorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587, [1943] 2 All ER 35 (CA) at 40 A – E.   
67 Hollington v F Hewtorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587, [1943] 2 All ER 35 (CA) at 40 A – E. 
68 Hollington v F Hewtorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587, [1943] 2 All ER 35 (CA) at 40 A – E. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
17 
 
Court of Criminal Appeal with no success. Subsequent to that, Sparks, a journalist, published 
a statement stating that Hinds had previously committed a robbery. Hinds then sued Sparks 
for defamation. Sparks had no proof to tender before the court to show that Hinds had indeed 
committed the robbery other than the robbery conviction itself. The Hollington rule then 
militated against the admissibility of the conviction evidence and in the light of that, Hinds 
won his claim.
69
  
In Goody v Odhams Press Ltd proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff for defamation 
against the newspaper which had published an article conveying his involvement in a 
notorious train robbery. When the action was instituted the plaintiff was already serving a 
sentence of 30 years imprisonment after having been convicted of participating in the robbery 
in question. The Court held that a conviction does not amount to evidence of guilt, so much 
so that it does not even at least amount to prima facie evidence.
70
 
Last but not least, in Rondel v. Worsley
71
 the issue, among others, was whether counsel could 
be sued for professional negligence. Rondel, who had been charged with, and convicted of, 
assault with grievous bodily harm (GBH) and believed that he would have been acquitted if 
counsel had conducted defence well, brought this action. The Court of Appeal ruled that a 
barrister could not be proceeded against. Similarly to Hinds and Goody, Rondel was also 
canvassing his guilt or innocence in the civil court which, in the light of the Hollington rule, 
was not admissible. 
2.4 Abolition of the Hollington Rule 
The previous conviction evidence, as has been expounded on above, remained an unresolved 
issue insofar as its admissibility as proof in subsequent civil suits was concerned. The courts 
were not united in a single view as some were for and others against its admissibility. The 
uncertainty in question was finally settled in the Hollington case where it was held that 
conviction evidence should be treated as irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. This precedent 
was followed in subsequent cases and was adopted even in foreign jurisdictions. After a series 
of criticisms, the Hollington rule was finally laid to rest in England.
72
 
                                                            
69 Hinds v Sparks [1964] Crim LR 717. 
70 Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 (CA) at page 339, [1966] 3 All E.R. 369 page 371. 
71 Rondel v. Worsley [1966] 3 W.L.R. 950; [1966] 3 All E.R. 657. 
72 Cowen & Carter ‗Essays in the law of evidence‘ 1 ed (1956) 196; 15th Report (The Rule in Hollington v F 
Hewthorn & Co Ltd) (1967) Cmnd 3391, para 4. 
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2.4.1 Law Reform Commission 
In Barclays Bank, Ltd. v. Cole
73
 the Hollington rule was criticised and the Master of the Rolls 
was of the view that it should be changed in the light its repercussions in England, namely, 
the reliance thereon by criminals in subsequent civil proceedings.
74
 Consequent to that line of 
criticism, Lord Gardiner L.C. referred the implications of the rule in Hollington to the 
distinguished Law Reform Committee (LRC) tasked with scrutinising it with a view to 
improving the law of evidence in civil law suits.
75
 The LRC was of the view that the 
Hollington rule militated against the sense of justice.
76
 It further remarked that a finding by a 
court on culpability was an expression of opinion that was different from that of a mere 
passer-by who witnessed an accident. Those opinions, it was stated in the Report, are 
formulated by persons (judges and magistrates among others) having a legal duty to formulate 
them and to determine legal issues. It was also stated that when these persons formulate those 
opinions they do so within the confines of the law of evidence. It was further stated that those 
opinions have serious consequences as they pronounce serious findings in criminal and civil 
matters which findings are enforced by the executive branch of government.
77
 
The LRC also expressed the common sense perspective that the criminal law standard of 
proof was superior to that of the civil law. It entails that a guilty finding in an opposed 
criminal trial has considerable probative value compared to that of civil proceedings riling. 
Even a layman would perceive that the fact of such a conviction was a strong basis upon 
which to believe that an accused had in fact behaved in a blameworthy manner, and that if the 
conduct also amounted to a civil wrong, then that civil wrong will, by the same token, be 
deemed to have been committed.
78
  
The LRC was of the view that people who plead guilty usually do so when they are actually 
guilty. The LRC suggested that there could be no reason in logic or in common sense why a 
consequential conviction should not have probative value in establishing that an accused was 
in fact guilty of the conduct for which he had been convicted.
79
 The LRC suggested further 
that where the party has been convicted by a competent UK court that conviction must be 
                                                            
73 Barclays Bank, Ltd. v. Cole [1967] 2 Q.B. 738 (C.A). 
74 Barclays Bank, Ltd. v. Cole [1967] 2 Q.B. 738 (C.A.) at 743; See also Osew E.A ‗The Criminal in the Civil 
Court‘ (1970) 2 RGL 84 page 85. 
75 Zeffert D ‗The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 325 page 325 
76 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 3 
77 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 4 
78 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 3-6 
79 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 12; see also Zeffert D ‗The Rule 
in Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 325 page 326.  
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accepted in any successive civil suits as sufficient proof of liability unless it is proved that the 
conviction was incorrect.
80
 
One could ask: how did the LRC deal with cases of defamation such as in cases such as Hinds 
v Sparks
81
 and Goody v Odhams Press Ltd
82
 where it was held that the criminal convictions 
did not serve as proof that the accused had indeed committed the offences of which they were 
convicted? The LRC accordingly recommended that where an action for defamation was 
instituted in the light of a judgement which reflected that a party is guilty of conduct which 
constitutes a criminal offence, then a finding made by a competent court in the UK should be 
conclusive proof that a person stands convicted or acquitted as the case may be.
83
 The LRC 
then made the following recommendations. First, it was suggested that whether passed by a 
magistrate or on indictment a conviction should be admitted as relevant in later civil 
proceedings even if a convicted person is not involved in those subsequent civil proceedings. 
Such a conviction must suffice as proof that the convicted person was guilty. Secondly, the 
conviction must not serve as conclusive evidence, however the duty to prove that such 
conviction was erroneous ought to rest on the party that so alleges. Thirdly, the position with 
acquittals should be different. Acquittals should be treated as inadmissible evidence when 
they are tendered to prove that the acquitted party is indeed innocent. Fourthly, proof of 
previous acquittal and conviction will serve as conclusive evidence of the facts in defamation 
cases as to the guilt or innocence of parties. Fifthly and lastly, civil judgements should be 
inadmissible. However, the paternity findings arrived at in the affiliation proceedings and the 
adultery findings arrived at in the matrimonial proceedings before the County or High Court
84
 
ought to be accepted as prima facie proof in later civil litigation.
85
 
The foregoing criticisms and recommendations paved the way for new legislation that was 
enacted to shed light on and address, among other things, the issue of admission as evidence 
                                                            
80 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 13 
81 Hinds v Sparks [1964] Crim LR 717 
82 Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 (CA) at page 339, [1966] 3 All E.R. 369 at 371 
83 15th Report ('The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn') (1967), Cmnd. 3391 para 26 - 31 
84 But not in a magistrates' court as the alleged adulterer has no legal right to appear and defend the allegation if 
not the respondent to the summons. See also Dean M ‗Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in 
Hollington v. Hewthorn‘ (1968) 31 TMLR 58 footnote 6. 
85Dean M ‗Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn‘ (1968) 31 TMLR 
58 page 58-59. Similar recommendations were made in the Denning Report on Matrimonial Causes (1947) 
Cmd. 7024; and the Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956) Cmd. 9678. See also 
Dean M ‗Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn‘ (1968) 31 TMLR 58 
footnote 7. 
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the convictions of the criminal court in subsequent civil proceedings as was found in the 
Hollington rule. 
2.4.2 Civil Evidence Act 1968 
The Civil Evidence Act
86
 was enacted following the LRC recommendations mentioned 
above. Section 11 of the Act specifically reflects the recommendations of the LRC Report, 
and thus altered the position as found in the Court of Appeal decision in Hollington. 
According to this section, in any civil proceedings, with only the exception of an action for 
defamation, the fact that a person has, by any competent court in the UK, been found guilty of 
any offence is admissible in proving that she had truly committed the said offence should that 
fact be relevant. That remains the case whether or not she later becomes a party to the 
subsequent civil proceedings.
87
 
Having given an outline of section 11 it is important to examine section 13 of the Act. Section 
13 stipulates that in any defamation or slander (false/unsupported statement) action in which 
it is relevant whether or not a person did commit an offence, the conviction evidence will be 
conclusive proof of guilt.
88
 The position is not the same where a defamation that is 
anticipated in section 13 is not involved. Section 11(2) provides that where it has been proved 
that a party has been found guilty of a criminal offence, there will be a rebuttable presumption 
that she had actually committed it until the presumption has been successfully rebutted.
89
   
Before one becomes over-optimistic about the abolition of the Hollington rule by the Civil 
Evidence Act, it must be noted that this Act brought along with it other questions to be 
                                                            
86 Civil Evidence Act 1968 
87 Civil Evidence Act 1968 s 11. – ‗(1) In any civil proceedings the fact that a person has been convicted of an 
offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or by a court-martial there or elsewhere shall (subject to 
subsection (3) below) be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any 
issue in those proceedings, that he committed that offence, whether he was so convicted upon a plea of guilty or 
otherwise and whether or not he is a party to the civil proceedings; but no conviction other than a subsisting one 
shall be admissible in evidence by virtue of this section[...]‘ 
88 Civil Evidence Act 1968 s13. – ‗(1) In an action for libel' or slander in which the question whether a person 
did or did not commit a criminal offence is relevant to an issue arising in the action, proof that, at the time when 
that issue falls to be determined, that person stands convicted of that offence shall be conclusive evidence that 
he committed that offence; and his conviction thereof shall be admissible in evidence accordingly [...]‘ 
89 Civil Evidence Act 1968, s 11 (2); See also Zeffert D ‗The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 
87 SALJ 325 page 328. 
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answered and other implications relating to the very same problem it sought to settle and 
clarify. This issue is discussed next. 
2.4.3 Repercussions of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 
Although the CEA was enacted to deal with the Hollington rule together with its 
repercussions, it actually came into play with a degree of uncertainty. The ball was back on 
the judiciary‘s court to decide the extent of the application of its relevant sections. J.W 
Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd
90
 was the first case to be heard under the relevant 
provisions of the Act. This case dealt with the meaning and extent of the application of 
section 11 (2) which provides that a previous conviction will, if relevance to the matter, be 
admissible evidence that the convicted has indeed committed an offence unless and until the 
‗contrary is proven‘.91  
In the light of section 11, the question was whether it had to mean that one must, as Goddard 
J. put it in the Hollington case, retry the criminal case when the accuracy of the previous 
conviction is challenged in the subsequent civil proceedings?
92
 Again, if only the conviction 
is to be considered then how does a subsequent civil court determine its weight? It was argued 
that courts must consider what evidence was given and whether the jury did believe it before 
a proper determination of the previous conviction‘s weight may be made. An assessment may 
have to be made a long time after the conviction, and Paull J had to, and in fact did evaluate 
the evidence of witnesses that were uncertain at the subsequent civil trial when they had been 
certain at the first trial. According to Zeffert, with those views I agree, this was nowhere near 
extinguishing the flames of difficulty on that issue.93 
Paull J rejected the argument that he was entitled to consider the way in which the original 
trial was conducted in deciding the correctness of the conviction that was challenged before 
him.
94
 In Wauchope v. Mordecai the Court of Appeal left open the question whether section 
11 imposed an extremely heavy standard of proof.95 Needless to say, the findings of the LRC 
as reflected in section 11 of the CEA are also subject to criticism, and in the light of the 
                                                            
90 J.W Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd [1970] 1 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.), [1970] 2 W.L.R. 124 S M 
91 Civil Evidence Act s 11 (2) (a) 
92 J.W Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd [1970] 1 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.) at 395 
93 Zeffert D ‗The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 325 page 330 
94 J.W Stupple v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd [1970] 1 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.) page 395 See also Zeffert D ‗The Rule in 
Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 325 page 330 
95 Wauchope v. Mordecai [1970] 1 All E.R. 417 (C.A.), [1970] 1 W.L.R. 317 
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circumstances outlined above, a stronger case may be presented in favour of the retention of 
the Hollington rule.96 
In 1981 in an attempt to deal with the foregoing state of affairs, the House of Lords in Hunter 
v Chief Constable of the West Midlands,97 held that the use of a civil action to initiate a 
rebuttal of the criminal court‘s final decision amounted to an abuse of the civil court process 
when there existed no new proof which completely altered the aspect of the case. In CXX v 
DXX, the defendant, a consultant physician, initiated a challenge of a previous conviction. He 
had had an intimate affair with the applicant who had worked as a medical secretary. The 
latter later became pregnant and refused the former‘s suggestion of pregnancy termination. 
With the intention to terminate her pregnancy he contaminated her drinks (tea, coffee, and 
orange juice) with an abortifacient agent, a conduct for which he was tried and convicted in 
the Crown Court. Leave to appeal against the convictions was denied. The victim then 
instituted a delictual claim against the defendant for damages and in doing so she relied on his 
conviction in terms of section 11 of the English CEA. The defendant contended that his 
conviction was erroneous mainly in the light of the serious inconsistencies in the victim‘s 
evidence at trial. That defence was rejected on the basis that it amounted to an abuse of 
process. The Court then went on to enter summary judgement in the applicant‘s (victim) 
favour.  
On appeal, Spencer J disagreed with the court a quo on the finding of abuse of process and 
noted that in the light of section 11, challenging a previous conviction does not automatically 
result in an abuse of process because the CEA permits such a challenge. However, the learned 
Judge dismissed the appeal against the summary judgement on evidential grounds rather than 
on anything else, noting that the defendant fell short of having any real prospects of success 
in his defence.98 
Furthermore, in McCauley v Vine, the defendant had a summary conviction for a small traffic 
offence. Consequent to that conviction, in a civil claim instituted for shockingly high 
damages, the plaintiff relied on the conviction for that small traffic offence. The Court set the 
evidential standard to be used in combatting an action for a summary judgement and held that 
the standard is lower than ‗evidence that completely alters the aspect of the case‘.99 Dyson 
                                                            
96 Zeffert D ‗The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 325 page 330 
97 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] A.C. 529 
98 CXX v DXX [2012] EWHC 1535 (QB) para 34 - 35 
99 McCauley v Vine [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1977. 
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and Randall correctly opine that contesting a civil claim was not an abuse per se as doing so 
was permitted by section 11 of the CEA.
100
 
2.5 Impact of other Relevant Legislation 
Subsequent to the CEA, further legislation were enacted on the same subject relating to the 
effects of criminal convictions on subsequent civil proceedings. This section will expand on 
those pieces legislation and reflect on their relevant provisions that have a bearing on the 
admissibility of criminal court judgements in civil proceedings. These pieces of legislation 
include the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
101
 and the Criminal Justice Act.
102
 
2.5.1 Impact of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PCEA) 
The PCEA provides that in any proceedings the fact that a person other than the accused has 
been convicted will be admissible if relevant to the matter at hand if such person was 
convicted by UK court or by a Service Court outside the UK whether or not any other 
evidence has been tendered to prove the commission of the offence for which she had been 
convicted by such courts.103 The Act further states that once such conviction is shown, the 
                                                            
100 Dyson M. et Randall J ‗Criminal Convictions and The Civil Courts‘ (2015) 71(1) CLJ 78 page 81. 
101 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
102 Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
103 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 74. – ‗(1) In any proceedings the fact that a person other than the 
accused has been convicted of an offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or by a Service Court 
outside the United Kingdom shall be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is 
relevant to any issue in those proceedings, that that person committed the offence, whether or not any other 
evidence of his having committed that offence is given. 
(2) In any proceedings in which by virtue of this section a person other than the accused is proved to have been 
convicted of an offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or by a Service Court outside the United 
Kingdom, he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved. 
(3) In any proceedings where evidence is admissible of the fact that the accused has committed an offence, in so 
far as that evidence is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings for a reason other than a tendency to 
show in the accused a disposition to commit the kind of offence with which he is charged, if the accused is 
proved to have been convicted of the offence –  
 (a) by or before any court in the United Kingdom; or 
 (b) by a Service Court outside the United Kingdom, 
He shall be taken to have committed that offence unless contrary is proved. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice –  
(a) the admissibility in evidence of any conviction which would be admissible apart from this section; 
or 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
24 
 
person that was so convicted will be deemed to have actually committed that offence unless 
the contrary is proved.104  
The wording of these provisions is akin to that of section 11 of the CEA in that it allows for 
the admissibility of conviction evidence and, by the same token, provides leeway for 
contesting that conviction.105 Section 74 also finds application in criminal proceedings in that 
it allows for the admissibility in subsequent criminal proceedings of the conviction evidence 
tendered with the sole purpose to prove that the accused had actually committed that 
offence.106 However, as indicated above, this dissertation is not a rigorous exploration of 
conviction evidence in relation to on subsequent criminal proceedings, but civil proceeding. 
2.5.2 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) 
The CJA107 defines bad character evidence as evidence that shows misconduct or a disposition 
towards misconduct except the one that directly relates to the investigation or facts of the 
offence.
108
 It, as Tandy correctly pointed out, follows that conviction evidence that is directly 
related in such a way will fall under this definition and will therefore be admissible.
109
 The 
CJA is concerned about, and applies to, the admissibility of conviction and acquittal evidence 
in subsequent criminal, and not civil, proceedings and will not be expounded on any further 
due to its falling beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Having highlighted the legal developments in England, particularly in the context of the 
Hollington rule, necessity begs the same outline in the South African context. However, this 
chapter was meant to investigate the English law only and has in its scope no discussion of 
the South African law. The extent and complexities of the South African jurisprudence on this 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 (b) the operation of any enactment whereby a conviction or a finding in any proceedings is for the 
purpose of any  
other proceedings made conclusive evidence of any fact.‘ 
104 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 74 (2). 
105 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 74; see also Civil Evidence Act 1968 s11-13. 
106 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 74 (3). 
107 Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
108 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 98. – ‗References in this Chapter to evidence of a person‘s ―bad character‖ are to 
evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which— 
(a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or 
(b) is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence.‘ 
109 Tandy R ‗The Admissibility of a Defendant‘s Previous Criminal Record: A Critical Analysis of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003‘ (2009) 30(3) SLR 203 page 204. 
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topic demand a separate chapter and the following one, that is a third chapter, will consist of a 
deep exploration of that. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The rule in Hollington originated in England. It was established in 1943 by the Appeal Court 
in the case of Hollington v Hewthorn. The position before this case was unclear in England as 
the courts were not united on whether a criminal court judgement should be admissible as 
evidence in civil proceedings. The Hollington rule was finally abolished by the Civil 
Evidence Act of 1968. This Act was followed by other legislation such as the CJA and the 
PCEA, containing provisions that are akin to those of the Civil Evidence Act. 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
26 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE RECEPTION, APPLICATION AND EXPANSION OF THE RULE 
HOLLINGTON IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the South African law relating to the admissibility of conviction 
evidence in subsequent civil proceedings. I will deal with the legal position as it was prior to 
the coming into existence of the relevant pieces of legislation such as the SuCA
110
 as repealed 
by the SupCA of 2013
111
 and the CPEA.
112
 This chapter chronologically traces the legal 
developments in South Africa in relation to the admissibility of conviction evidence in civil 
proceedings. South Africa, being a former colony (a so-called commonwealth country) of 
England received some of its law from the English legal system and that is evident in the 
residuary rule in the CPEA.
113
 This chapter also highlights the reception of the Hollington rule 
into South African law, and its application and expansion by the courts. This Chapter 
highlights the negative effects that the Hollington rule yielded and still continues to yield in 
South Africa. To that end, this chapter refers to the relevant statutory provisions, namely, but 
not limited to, the SupCA and the CPEA and the relevant case law. 
3.2 The Hollington Rule in South Africa  
This section discusses when and how the rule in Hollington was received into South African 
law. Case law is discussed as the inception of the Hollington rule was through case law and 
not legislation. This section further highlights how the courts grappled with the issue of 
criminal court judgement‘s admissibility as evidence in later civil proceedings.  
3.2.1 The Inception of the Rule in Hollington in South Africa  
Before the coming into existence of the rule in Hollington the South African courts were 
consistent in accepting conviction evidence in undefended civil proceedings.
114
 However, in 
defended civil proceedings different considerations applied: the courts consistently rejected 
                                                            
110 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
111 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. 
112 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 65 of 1965. 
113 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s 42. – ‗The law of evidence including the law relating to the 
competency, compellability, examination and cross-examination of witnesses which was in force in respect of 
civil proceedings on the thirtieth day of May, 1961, shall apply in any case not provided for by this Act or any 
other law.‘ 
114 Botha v Van Rensburg 1908 E.D.C 339; Ruxton v Ruxton 1925 W.L.D 234; Nicholson v Nicholson 1927 
E.D.L 164; Exparte Snitcher 1938 E.D.L 202; Cassell v Cassell 1941 E.D.L 123. 
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conviction evidence.
115
 It is unclear in which specific South African case the rule in 
Hollington was borrowed from England. The courts have since the formulation of the rule in 
Hollington held themselves bound to exclude the conviction evidence in civil proceedings. 
The position after the Hollington case will be discussed next. 
3.2.2 The Position After the birth of the Hollington Rule 
In Postmaster General v. Stadlander116 there was an application for a restraint order to 
prevent a convicted thief from disposing of the stolen money. The Court admitted the 
conviction in the light of the urgent nature of the application and the fact that interim relief 
was being asked for. In R v Xaki117 the Court held that the fact that a defendant was convicted 
of theft by a criminal court was irrelevant, and inadmissible evidence in subsequent civil 
proceedings in proving, that such defendant did in fact commit the theft for which he had 
been convicted in the criminal court. Furthermore, in Du Toit v Grobler118 the Court 
convicted the accused (now the defendant) of stealing a sum of money from the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff then instituted civil proceedings in an attempt to recover the money as a civil debt 
and presented the conviction by the criminal court of the defendant, but the civil court was of 
the view that such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible in proving that the defendant had 
indeed stolen the money from the plaintiff. This was the position in South Africa after the 
birth of the Hollington rule, but in 1959 the legislature passed legislation whose provisions 
had, and still have, a bearing on this subject. 
3.2.3 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (SupCA) 
The SuCA was passed in 1959 and the commencement date was January 1960.119 This Act 
was intended, as per the preamble, to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the Supreme 
Court of South Africa and to make provision for related matters. The relevant provision of 
this Act was section 18 which provided that a copy of a judgement or order of the court 
would serve as prima facie evidence. Section 18 was to the effect that when referred to in any 
manner a certified copy of the court record, such as, a judgement, verdict, order or other 
record, that was so certified by the registrar of a relevant division would serve as prima facie 
                                                            
115 Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 335; see also the case discussion 
by Davids J ‗Judgment as Evidence‘ (1968) 85 SALJ 76 - 77. 
116 Postmaster General v. Stadlander 1949 (2) S.A. 315 (T). 
117 R v Xaki 1950 (4) SA 332 (E); R v Lee 1952 (2) SA 67 (T); See also R v Markins Motors(pty) Ltd 1959 (3)  
SA 508 
118 Du Toit v Grobler 1947 (3) SA 588 (SWA). 
119 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
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evidence.
120
 That provision made it clear that a copy of the court judgement would be prima 
facie evidence when it is referred to in any manner. In 2013 the legislature enacted the 
SupCA,
121
 thereby repealing the SuCA. However, the legislature carried the provisions of 
section 18 of the SuCA over to the SupCA verbatim as reflected in section 34.
122
 
There does not appear to be any reason in logic why the expression ‗referred in any manner‘ 
should not include the reference to the previous convictions in subsequent civil proceedings. 
The title of section 34 of the SupCA reads ‗certified copies of court records admissible as 
evidence‘ which explicitly suggests that this section was meant for no any other purpose than 
the admissibility of court records including judgements as evidence. It can be argued further 
that the very reason why the legislature carried the provisions of the repealed Act over to the 
new Act was to ensure that judgement evidence still becomes admissible evidence. It can be 
argued further that the legislature had no intention to succumb to the Hollington. 
Notwithstanding the existence of section 18 of the SuCA before it was repealed by the 
SupCA, the courts continued to disregard it and further rejected the evidence of previous 
convictions as irrelevant in subsequent civil proceedings. That state of affairs is evident in the 
judgements that were handed down subsequent to the commencement of the SuCA. In Yusuf v 
Baily the facts are similar to those in Goody v Odhams.
123
 The plaintiff was convicted of; 
fraud, following that conviction a certain press company released a publication to the effect 
that the plaintiff was a fraudster. It was on that basis that the plaintiff sued the press company 
for defamation. The Court held that the plaintiff who had been convicted of fraud was not a 
fraudster by virtue of a fraud conviction.
124
 
Furthermore, the Court in Birkett v Accident Fund,
125
 a case with facts that are mostly 
analogous and akin to those of Hollington v Hewthorn,
126
 also followed the Yusuf case and 
                                                            
120 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 18. – ‗Whenever a judgment, decree, order or other record of the court of a 
division is required to be proved or inspected or referred to in any manner, a copy of such judgement, decree, 
order or other record duly certified as such by the registrar of that division under its seal shall be prima facie 
evidence thereof without proof of the authenticity of such registrar‘s signature.‘ 
121 Supreme Court Act 10 of 2013. 
122 SupCA, s 34. 
123 Goody v Odhams Press Ltd [1967] 1 QB 333 (CA). – In this case proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff 
for defamation against the newspaper which had released an article conveying his involvement in a notorious 
train robbery. When the action was instituted the plaintiff was already serving a sentence of 30 years of 
imprisonment after having been convicted of partaking in the robbery in question. The court held that a 
conviction does not amount to evidence of guilt so much so that it does not even at least amount to a prima facie 
evidence. 
124 Yusuf v Baily (1964) SA 117 (W). 
125 Birkett v Accident Fund 1964 (1) S.A. 561 (T). 
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expressly stated that the Court was bound by the Hollington case and consequently by the 
Hollington rule as well. Not long after the enactment of the SuCA another statute, the CPEA, 
was enacted. The CPEA was intended to do away specifically with the Hollington rule in 
South Africa. This piece of legislation will be expounded on below. 
3.2.4 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 (CPEA) 
The CPEA was passed and commenced in 1965. The purpose for which it was passed was that 
it was intended to update the law of evidence with regard to civil proceedings.
127
 The relevant 
provisions are sections 17 and 42 insofar as they address the issue of the admissibility of 
previous convictions in civil proceedings. These provisions will be quoted somewhat 
extensively for their significance not only with regard to this dissertation‘ but generally on 
this subject.  
Section 17 of the CPEA provides that a trial, acquittal or conviction of any party can be 
proved merely by a certified document issued by the registrar, deputy registrar, clerk of the 
court or any other dully authorised court officer that has the custody of such document. That 
person must be from the court where such trial, acquittal or conviction took place and that 
document will be deemed to be a duplicate of the trial, acquittal or conviction as the case may 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
126 Hollington v Hewthorn 2 [1943] All ER 35. – ‗This case arose out of collision between two cars on a 
highway in which the plaintiff's car was damaged. The driver of the defendant's car was convicted in the 
magistrates' court of careless driving. His conduct amounted to the tort of actionable negligence at the suit the 
other user of the highway who had sustained damage as a result of the careless driving. The plaintiff sued the 
driver and his employer for damages caused by this tort, but before the hearing the driver of the plaintiff's car 
died, depriving the plaintiff of his only witness. He sought to put in evidence the conviction of the driver to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence against him. The Court of Appeal held this evidence to be 
inadmissible and the plaintiff's action failed.‘ 
127 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 Preamble. – ‗To state the law of evidence in regard to civil 
proceedings, to repeal the Ordinance for altering, amending, and declaring in certain respect the Law of 
Evidence within this Colony, 1830 (Cape), the Ordinance for improving the Law of Evidence,1846 (Cape), the 
Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1877 (Cape), the Oaths and Declarations Act, 1891 (Cape), the Law to regulate 
the Law of Evidence In the Colony Of Natal, 1859 (Natal), the Law to amend the Law of Endence,1870 (Natal), 
the Law to provide for the production in evidence of Copies, instead of Originals, of Public Documents,1884 
(Natal) and the Presumption of Death of Soldiers Act, 1952, to amend the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, 
1861 (Cape), the Law to make further provision in respect of the substitution, in certain cases, of Declarations 
for Oaths, 1862 (Natal), the Law of Evidence Ordinance, 1902 (Orange Free. State), the Law of Evidence 
Proclamation, 1902 (Transvaal), the Administration of Justice Proclamation, 1919 (South-West Africa), the 
Further Administration of Justice Proclamation, 1920 (South-West Africa), the Procedure and Evidence 
Proclamation, 1938 (South-West Africa), the General Law Amendment Act, 1935, the General Law 
Amendment Act, 1952, the Criminal Procedure Act 1955, and the Evidence Act, 1962, and to provide for other 
incidental matters.‘ 
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be.
128
 This section ought to be read together with the residuary clause, section 42 of the 
CPEA.  
Section 42 of the CPEA provides that the law relating to the compellability, examination and 
cross-examination, and competency of witnesses which was, on 30 May 1961, applicable to 
civil proceedings will also apply in any circumstances for which provision is not by the CPEA 
or any other law.
129
  
Section 17 provides that the production of a certified court judgement may be admissible 
proof in civil proceedings. On the other hand, section 42 provides that when the CPEA is 
silent on any matter, then that matter upon which it is silent will be dealt with in terms of the 
law which was applicable on 30 May 1961. This therefore means that a judge in a civil suit 
cannot apply section 42 when section 17 or any other provision of the CPEA applies. This 
chapter holds the view that the birth of section 18 of the SuCA and section 34 of the SupCA 
and section 17 of the CPEA brought an end to the Hollington rule. However, case law shows 
that the courts have not only ignored section 17 of the CPEA and section 18 of the SuCA but 
have also extended the ambit of the Hollington rule. The next section analyses this issue in 
detail. 
3.2.5 Application & expansion of the Hollington Rule Subsequent to the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act 
In S v Mavuso
130
 Hefer JA, by way of an obiter dictum, stated that it was an open question 
whether the relevant conviction evidence would not be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal 
matter because of the Hollington rule. This view can be argued to have been oblivious to the 
prescripts of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Act which marks, as a general rule, the 
previous convictions as irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in criminal matters unless the 
exceptions listed there therein are met.
131
 However, this dissertation is primarily on conviction 
                                                            
128 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s 17. – ‗The trial and conviction or acquittal of any person may 
be proved by the production of a document certified or purporting to be certified by the registrar or clerk of the 
court or other officer having the custody of the records of the court where such conviction or acquittal took 
place, or by the deputy of such registrar, clerk or other officer, to be a copy of the record of the charge and of the 
trial, conviction and judgment or acquittal, as the case may be, omitting the formal parts thereof.‘ 
129 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 s 42. – ‗The law of evidence including the law relating to the 
competency, compellability, examination and cross-examination of witnesses which was in force in respect of 
civil proceedings on the thirtieth day of May, 1961, shall apply in any case not provided for by this Act or any 
other law.‘ 
130 S v Mavuso 1987 (3) SA 499 (A) at 505F 
131 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 197. – ‗An accused who gives evidence at criminal proceedings 
shall not be asked or 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
31 
 
evidence in subsequent civil proceedings, and subsequent criminal matters fall beyond its 
scope. 
In 1979 the Appellate Division in S v Khanyapa132 held that the Hollington rule found no 
application in proceedings to strike an attorney off the roll on the basis that those proceedings 
were not civil proceedings as anticipated in the CPEA. In Society of Advocates of South Africa 
(Witwatersrand Division) v Rottanburg133 the Bar Council applied to court to have a certain 
advocate struck off the roll. The Council wanted to adduce its own prior finding that the 
advocate was no longer fit and proper for practice. The Court held that the Hollington rule did 
find application to the findings of the Bar Council (that an advocate was unfit for practice). 
The Court reasoned and stated that admitting the Council‘s finding as evidence would allow it 
to constitute presumptive evidence in a matter to which the Council was a party. Although the 
Court had extended the ambit of the Hollington rule from criminal court judgements to a 
findings of a Bar Council, in this context admitting the Council‘s evidence would have led to 
a situation where a party produced self-manufactured evidence. 
The absurdity of the Hollington rule, as Paizes and Zeffert134 put it, is well demonstrated by 
Leeb and another v Leeb and another.135 In that case the first respondent had been convicted 
of murdering her spouse and the matter was, on application, heard by Thirion J. The question 
before the honourable Judge was whether the errant spouse could benefit from her marriage to 
the deceased that was in community of property since she would inherit with bloody hands. 
Thirion J. remarked that the Hollington rule had been criticised as being controversial in Cape 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
required to answer any question tending to show that he has committed or has been convicted of or has been 
charged with any offence other than the offence with which he is charged, or that he is of bad character, unless- 
(a) he or his legal representative asks any question of any witness with a view to establishing his own 
good character or he himself gives evidence of his own good character, or the nature or conduct of the 
defence is such as to involve imputation of the character of the complainant or any other witness for the 
prosecution; 
(b) he gives evidence against any other person charged with the same offence or an offence in respect 
of the same facts; 
(c) the proceedings against him are such as are described in section 240 or 241 and the notice under 
those sections has been given to him; or 
(d) the proof that he has committed or has been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence 
to show that he is guilty of the offence with which he is charged.‘ 
132 S v Khanyapa 1979 (1) SA 824 (A) para 8. 
133 Society of Advocates of South Africa (Witwatersrand Division) v Rottanburg 1984 (4) SA 35 (T) discussed in 
Zeffertt DT & Paizes The South African Evidence 2 ed (2009) 343. 
134 Society of Advocates of South Africa (Witwatersrand Division) v Rottanburg 1984 (4) SA 35 (T) discussed in 
Zeffertt DT & Paizes The South African Evidence 2 ed (2009) 342. 
135 Leeb and another v Leeb and another [1999] 2 All SA 588 (N). 
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Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments,
136
 but that rule had not been abolished and that 
it continued to be part of South African law. The learned Judge went on to remark that he was 
bound thereby and he likewise concluded that the conviction of the first respondent for 
murdering the deceased was therefore not evidence that she had indeed murdered her 
husband, and it ultimately was to be treated as inadmissible. 
In Groenewald N.O and Another v Swanepoel, the Court held that it was bound by the 
Hollington rule on the basis of the residuary section. It held that the South African courts are 
constrained by section 42 of the CPEA to always revert back to and apply the law of evidence 
as it was on 30 May 1961 to civil matters before them.
137
 The Court went on to hold that the 
Hollington rule should therefore apply. The Court stated, most importantly, that a judgement 
handed down by a competent criminal court will nonetheless be inadmissible evidence in later 
civil litigation in a bid to prove that a convicted party is actually liable as per that 
conviction.
138
 
At its first opportunity several years subsequent to the Groenewald case, the Constitutional 
Court, despite the provisions of section 17 of the CPEA, decided to refer, without any 
criticism, to the Hollington rule. In its 2007 judgement in Prophet v NDPP, Nkabinde J., 
writing for the court, relied on the Hollington case, to hold that the Magistrate‘s judgement 
relating to a criminal trial was irrelevant and superfluous evidence as it amounted to an 
opinion on a matter on which a Judge might have to decide anyway.
139
 
It is regretful that the highest court of the land, the Constitutional Court, came to that 
conclusion despite the existence of section 18 of the SuCA and section 17 of the CPEA. The 
Constitutional Court, it can be rightfully argued, ought to have taken upon itself to bring the 
law of evidence up to date in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing statutes. The 
Court merely accepted and reinforced the Hollington rule, especially in the light of the fact 
that this rule has been treated with scepticism by the inferior courts, such as the Appellate 
Division in the case of Cape Pacific v Lubner.
140
 
Subsequent to that Constitutional Court judgement, a long line of High Court cases emerged 
that also relied on that principle and cited the Hollington rule in denying the admissibility as 
                                                            
136 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling investments 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
137 Groenewald N.O and Another v Swanepoel 2002 (6) SA 724 (E) page 727E. 
138 Groenewald N.O and Another case, page 727E. 
139 Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC) at footnote 26 & para 42. 
140 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling investments 1995 (4) SA 790 (A).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
33 
 
evidence of the convictions of the criminal courts in subsequent civil law suits. The logic 
behind the rejection of the conviction evidence was no more than the fact that it constituted 
opinion evidence which had no relevance, and those cases include, but are not limited to, Nel 
v Law Society, Cape of Good Hope
141
 and Lagoon Beach Hotel v Lehane.142  
The courts further went on to extend the application of the Hollington rule to include the 
awards of the CCMA commissioners as opinion evidence of such commissioners, which 
therefore ought not to be admissible evidence in proving any relevant issue or fact before a 
presiding officer in subsequent civil proceedings for lack of relevance in cases such Graham v 
Park Mews Body Corporate and Another,143 just to mention one. 
3.3 De bloedige hand en neemt geen erf Enis Principle 
The doctrine of de bloedige hand neemt geen erf (bloedige hand) has been part of our 
common law since Roman times and was derived from the Roma-Dutch law and not from the 
English law. It dictates that murder makes the murderer unworthy to inherit from the deceased 
based on the logic that bloody hands cannot inherit.
144
 One could ask, what happens if a 
criminal court finds X guilty of murdering her husband and then later on the errant party 
wants to inherit from the deceased as a surviving spouse? Will the conviction of the criminal 
court be disregarded as opinion evidence and the bloedige hand doctrine be rendered useless 
or at least extremely difficult to prove? These are relevant questions and this dissertation will 
investigate and critically present the current and answers to them. 
The relevant case on this issue is that of Danielz NO v De Wet and another.
145
 In this case, the 
applicant (executor of the deceased‘s estate) sought an order declaring that the respondent had 
no entitlement to the proceeds of certain life insurance policies that were taken out on the life 
of the deceased. The first respondent was married to the deceased and was the sole nominated 
beneficiary of those life insurance policies. However, the first respondent had hired a person 
to assault the deceased, and the deceased had died as a result of that attack. The criminal court 
                                                            
141 Nel v Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 2010 (6) SA 263 [ECG) para 16 
142 Mulaudzi v Old Mutual Life Insurance Company (South Africa) Limited and Others, National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Another v Mulaudzi [2017] 3 All SA 520 (SCA) para 40; Lagoon Beach Hotel v 
Lehane [2016] 1 All SA 660 (SCA); 2016 (3) SA 143 (SCA) para 12. 
143 Graham v Park Mews Body Corporate and Another; 2012 (1) SA 355 (WCC); [2012] 1 All SA 167 (WCC) 
para 60; De Sousa and Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others [2017] 
3 All SA 47 (GJ) para 107. 
144 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C) para 37; see 
also Ex parte Steenkamp and Steenkamp 1952 (1) SA 744 (T) at 752GH for more grounds upon which a person 
will be deemed unworthy to inherit. 
145 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C) 
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found both parties, the direct and indirect perpetrators, guilty of murder, among other 
offences. In a subsequent civil court case, it was argued on behalf of the errant spouse that a 
criminal court conviction is, in terms of the Hollington rule, irrelevant opinion evidence 
which should likewise be inadmissible in subsequent civil proceedings.
146
 
The Court had to decide on the tension between the bloedige hand doctrine and the Hollington 
rule. Traverso AJP stated that the facts of the case before her could not apply. She reaffirmed 
that the Hollington rule is indeed part of South African law but in the case before her, the 
convicted party (Mrs De Wet), admitted to having committed the offence and it was on that 
basis that she admitted a previous conviction as admissible.147 
That conclusion by Traverso AJP is debatable. This chapter holds the view that it is an 
insufficient reasoning upon which the bloedig hand principle was preferred over the 
Hollington rule. The judge is cognisant of the Hollington rule, on the one hand, and is 
reluctant to use it, on the other. The fact that Mrs De Wet was convicted in a previous 
criminal court hearing for murder has no relevance according to the Hollington rule. The fact 
that Mrs De Wet admitted in a subsequent civil matter arising from that initial conviction 
before Traverso AJP of having conspired to murder her husband should have no relevance in 
that it does not conform to the prescripts of a guilty plea as anticipated in section 112 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.
148
 Even if it did conform to section 112 it would still be irrelevant 
                                                            
146 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C) para 17 
147 Danielz NO v De Wet and another, De Wet v Danielz NO and another [2008] 4 All SA 549 (C) para 18 
148 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s112. – ‗(1) Where an accused at a summary trial in any court pleads 
guilty to the offence charged, or to an offence of which he may be convicted on the charge and the prosecutor 
accepts that plea- 
(a) the presiding judge, regional magistrate or magistrate may, if he or she is of the opinion that the 
offence does not merit punishment of imprisonment or any other form of detention without the option 
of a fine or of a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in 
the Gazette, convict the accused in respect of the offence to which he or she has pleaded guilty on his 
or her plea of guilty only and- 
(i) impose any competent sentence, other than imprisonment or any other form of detention 
without the option of a fine or a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from 
time to time by notice in the Gazette; or 
(ii) deal with the accused otherwise in accordance with law; 
(b) the presiding judge, regional magistrate or magistrate shall, if he or she is of the opinion that the 
offence merits punishment of imprisonment or any other form of detention without the option of a fine 
or of a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice in the 
Gazette, or if requested thereto by the prosecutor, question the accused with reference to the alleged 
facts of the case in order to ascertain whether he or she admits the allegations in the charge to which he 
or she has pleaded guilty, and may, if satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence to which he or 
she has pleaded guilty, convict the accused on his or her plea of guilty of that offence and impose any 
competent sentence. 
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before Traverso AJP because of the Hollington rule. Traverso AJP just circumvented the 
Hollington rule in that matter. 
A specific argument along the lines of public policy would have been more convincing had 
Traverso AJP held that the Hollington rule was indeed applicable in the matter before her and 
that public policy in the circumstances demanded that the bloedige hand principle take 
preference over the Hollington rule. Such argument would have aligned with the spirit of the 
South African legal reasoning, and would have connoted that the Hollington principle is not 
absolute and that it could be limited when demanding considerations, such as public policy, 
necessitated. It can be argued that the courts are at liberty to borrow legal principles from 
foreign jurisdictions which are not reconcilable with the existing South African law.
149
 It can 
be argued further with respect that the courts, as things stand in South Africa, are at liberty to 
abuse their discretionary powers. They do so by circumventing the very principles they 
borrowed when they cannot reconcile them with the existing legal principles. 
Having deliberated on the inception and application of the Hollington rule in South Africa, 
this dissertation will engage with a comparative analysis, to establish the lessons that South 
Africa can learn from other jurisdictions on this subject.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The South African courts borrowed the rule in Hollington from English law but it is not clear 
in which specific case. Before this rule the South African courts consistently admitted 
conviction evidence in undefended civil proceedings but consistently rejected it in defended 
proceedings. After the establishment of the Hollington rule, courts consistently held 
themselves bound by it. This rule is irreconcilable with certain legal principles, such as, de 
bloedige hand principle, section 17 of the CPEA, and sections 18 of the SuCA now section 34 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 (2) If an accused or his legal adviser hands a written statement by the accused into court, in which the accused 
sets out the facts which he admits and on which he has pleaded guilty, the court may, in lieu of questioning the 
accused under subsection (1)(b), convict the accused on the strength of such statement and sentence him as 
provided in the said  subsection if the court is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence to which he has 
pleaded guilty: Provided that the court may in its discretion put any question to the accused in order to clarify 
any matter raised in the statement. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the prosecutor from presenting evidence on any aspect of the charge, or 
the court from hearing evidence, including evidence or a statement by or on behalf of the accused, with regard to 
sentence, or from questioning the accused on any aspect of the case for the purposes of determining an 
appropriate sentence.‘ 
149 Such as the Hollington principle which is not in conformity with sections 17 and 42 of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and arguably section 18 of Supreme Courts Act 59 of 1959. 
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of the SupCA. The courts have not tried to promote a satisfactory solution to the tension 
between these principles. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RULE IN HOLLINGTON 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates and critically analyses how other jurisdictions have dealt with the 
issue of the rule in Hollington. It also investigates the shortcomings that this rule brought 
about in those jurisdictions, and the mechanisms developed in dealing with those 
shortcomings. To that end, the English jurisdiction will not be considered because it has been 
considered extensively already in the second chapter. This chapter particularly targets the 
laws of jurisdictions such as Canada, New Zealand, the United States of America, and 
Australia. That is so because these jurisdictions had taken positive action and responded by 
legislative and other means to the rule in Hollington. From that analysis recommendations 
will be made on how South Africa may deal with the Hollington rule in the light of the 
methods adopted by the abovementioned jurisdictions. 
4.2 Foreign Jurisdictions 
This section rigorously expound on the legal developments in Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and the United States of America. Those developments include the abolition of the 
rule in Hollington. The abolishing legislation and court judgements of each of these 
jurisdictions will be discussed as well. 
4.2.1 Canada 
The Canadian legal system also was influenced by the Hollington case on the admissibility of 
criminal convictions in civil proceedings. The rule in Hollington was adopted by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in La Fonciere Compagnie d’Assurance de France v Perras and 
others
150
 which case was decided the same year in which the Hollington rule was laid down 
by the English court. In the La Fonciere case, the plaintiff demanded payment from the 
insurer (defendant) for damage to property. The insurer contended that the car accident which 
led to the damage followed as a result of the commission of a criminal offence by the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff contended that the accident resulted from negligence 
which was covered by the insurer. The Court then held that criminal convictions did not 
                                                            
150 La Fonciere Compagnie d’Assurance de France v. Perras and others [1943] S.C.R. 165. 
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amount to res judicata
151
 and the initial criminal conviction was rejected based on the same 
logic of inadmissibility.
152
  
On the reception of the Hollington rule in Canada, Mandel argued that although the La 
Fonciere case was cited in later cases as establishing the rule in Hollington, it is, based on its 
facts, mere authority that criminal court judgements do not lead to res judicata in civil 
proceedings. This learned author relied on the fact that the Supreme Court in La Fonciere did 
not explicitly state that the criminal convictions were inadmissible in later civil proceedings. 
It is, according to Mandel, authority that a criminal court decision does not constitute a res 
judicata in civil proceedings.
153
 
The Canadian law makers finally shed light on the issue in 1985 and took it upon themselves 
to enact the Evidence Act.
154
 This Act, as it stands with its amendments, today provides in 
section 12 that a certified judgement signed by the court clerk or other dully authorised court 
officers which judgement reflects the conviction or its reversal may be used as admissible 
evidence.
155
 The Canadian leading case on this legal development is Del Core v. College of 
Pharmacists.
156
 In the Del Core case, a pharmacist had a criminal conviction following the 
procurement of pharmaceuticals by illegal means and the admissibility of that conviction as 
evidence was subsequently challenged. The Court held that the previous convictions were 
indeed admissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings, but that the weight and extent 
of its probative value were to be determined on a case by case basis owing to the fact that the 
circumstances of each case differ.
157
  
The Court went on to pronounce on the finality of a conviction and held that it would only 
serve as prima facie, as opposed to conclusive, evidence. Blair JA stated that in the light of 
this the conviction may be objected to in various ways. His Lordship provided a way forward 
and stated that a conviction may be challenged or lessened but declined to give an exhaustive 
list as to the circumstances under which to do so. The Court further provided that the 
entitlement to challenge the conviction evidence is subject to limitations. The Court stated 
                                                            
151 Res judicata can be defined as a principle that the matter between the same parties relating to the same cause 
of action will not be entertained again once it has been decided on by a court of competent jurisdiction unless it 
is brought on review or appeal. 
152 La Fonciere Compagnie d’Assurance de France case. 
153 Mandel WM ‗Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Civil Trials‘ (2010) ARCL 5 – 6. 
154 Canada Evidence Act RSC, c. C-5. 
155 Canada Evidence Act RSC, c. C-5 s12. 
156 Del Core v. College of Pharmacists (Ontario) (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 
157 Del Core case para [60]. 
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that attacking the conviction merely as wrong would amount to an abuse of process. The 
court further clarified this position and stated that the principle of ‗abuse of process‘ would 
be invoked voluntarily by the courts in certain cases in order offset the attack on the 
conviction.
158
 The principles laid down were subsequently followed in cases such as Franco 
and others v. White.
159
  
In Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79160 the Supreme Court had to determine whether a 
judgement of a criminal court should be conclusive or rebuttable evidence in civil court, and 
whether it could be reopened and litigated. The Court embarked on what Blair JA refused to 
do in the Del Core case, and provided a list of examples of the circumstances in which 
criminal convictions as evidence may be rebuttable in the civil court. The Court took the view 
that the justice system‘s integrity is more likely to be enhanced and not impeached when the 
civil courts re-open and re-litigate the criminal matter. The Court cautioned that the 
reopening of a criminal court case relied on as evidence in the civil proceedings will only be 
done under the following circumstances. First, when it transpires that the initial criminal 
proceedings were affected by dishonesty or fraud. Secondly, when new evidence is available 
but was not in the initial criminal proceedings and its probative value changes the original 
outcome. Thirdly, the Court laid down a very wide and flexible condition to the effect that 
when the dictates of fairness demand that the courts should forego the original outcome and 
re-litigate the matter.
161
 
In Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc
162
 Binnie J expounded on the issue of estoppel (res 
judicata) and held that for it to be invoked with success in the admission of judgement 
evidence and the refusal to re-litigate the same matter three safeguards ought to be met. 
According to Binnie J, those precautions entail, first, that the issue before the civil court now 
must be the same as the one that has initially been pronounced on by the criminal court; 
Sscondly, the criminal court judgement that is now tendered before a civil court must have 
been final, and lastly, the parties to the civil proceedings must be the same parties to the 
initial criminal proceedings or their representatives.163 
                                                            
158 Del Core case para [61] - [62]. 
159 Franco et al. v. White, (2001) 53 O.R. (3d) 391 (Ont. C.A.). 
160 Toronto (CITY) v. CUPE [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77. 
161 Toronto (CITY) case para [52]. 
162 Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460. 
163 Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, para [25]. 
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Considering the admissibility of a ‗guilty plea‘ in a civil court as evidence to prove the 
liability of the defendant, the Canadian Supreme Court in English v Richmond
164
 grappled 
with this issue. The majority judgement ruled that a guilty plea was admissible in later civil 
proceedings because of its relevance.
165
 In the 2011 case of British Columbia v. Malik,
166
 the 
Court stated that the admission of the initial criminal court judgement in later civil 
proceedings will be determined by the purpose for which that previous criminal court 
judgement is tendered. The Court went on to express its support for the existing precedent 
and held that the Hollington rule was rigid and arbitrary, and refused to replace it with rules 
that were similarly inflexible.
167
 The Court then shed more light. It stated that once the 
criminal court judgement is admitted as evidence in civil proceedings, the circumstances of 
the individual cases, the issue of similarities, the nature of the initial law suit and the identity 
of the parties concerned is an open list that will help in the determination of the weight that 
ought to be attached to such evidence.  
Furthermore, the Court went another step ahead to consider the position of a disciplinary 
committee‘s findings in later civil suits. The Court was of the view that it was indeed 
admissible, and refused to pronounce on the weight to be attached to such evidence. The 
defendant, further held the Court, should be entitled to argue, in reliance on evidence, that 
such evidence must be given less weight in the successive civil suits. It was noted by the 
Court that more often than not the findings of the disciplinary body were opinions of persons 
who were not experts. The Court stated that that will be taken into account when the weight 
of the disciplinary committee findings becomes an issue in the civil suits. The Court further 
stated that the fact that a disciplinary body did not operate within the confines of the law of 
evidence rules was also going to be considered in the determination of its weight.
168
 
In conclusion, the legal position of criminal court judgements in subsequent civil suits is 
summed up by Carson. The quasi-criminal and criminal judgements are accepted as prima 
facie proof in Canada until compelling evidence is presented in rebuttal or sufficient 
clarification is provided to show its irrelevance in the present matter.169 
                                                            
164 English and Laing v. Richmond et al [1956] S.C.R. 383. 
165 English and Laing case, page 384.  
166 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Malik, 2011 SCC 18. 
167 British Columbia case, para 46. 
168 British Columbia case, para 32- 48. 
169 Carson P.A ‗Triple Jeopardy: Civil, Disciplinary, and Regulatory Proceedings against Professionals‘  
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4.2.2 New Zealand 
4.2.2.1 Prior to the enactment of the Evidence Act 2006 
Before the enactment of the Evidence Act,170 which explicitly abolished the Hollington rule in 
New Zealand, reliance was place on judicial precedent and the land-mark case on this issue 
was Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland).171It was established in this case that a conviction 
sufficed as proof in successive civil law suits to show that the party against whom such 
evidence was tendered was in fact guilty of the offence in question. The precedent established 
by that case was, later in 1980, codified and reflected in the Evidence Amendment Act.172 
Following that, courts in New Zealand were of the view that that the evidence of conviction 
as shown in the criminal court judgement was indeed admissible in subsequent civil 
proceedings. Because the extent of this position was unknown in the context of subsequent 
criminal proceedings courts extended the admissibility to successive criminal proceedings. 
Courts were of the view that such evidence was, by the same token, relevant and admissible 
in proving the commission of the offence.
173
 
4.2.2.2 Subsequent to the Enactment of the Civil Evidence Act 2006 
The New Zealand Law Reform Commission produced a Law of Evidence Report in 1999.174 
The Report recommended that the rule in Hollington be abolished in New Zealand. The 
reasons for the Report‘s recommendations were, according to the LRC, pillared by three 
policy considerations which will follow. First, the admission of criminal court judgements in 
successive civil suits will be convenient and cost effective in that the parties would not need 
to relitigate the matter that had already been decided. Secondly, the criminal court judgement 
was arrived at using the stronger standard proof and that becomes relevant and probative 
evidence available to prove that a party had indeed committed the offence in issue. The third 
reason was that the rejection of the criminal court judgement evidence will go against the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.millerthomson.com/en/publications/communiques-and-updates/lloyds-brief-canadian-legal-
perspectives/september-2015/triple-jeopardy-civil-disciplinary-and/  (Accessed 18 July 2018). 
170 Evidence Act 2006. 
171 Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 (CA). 
172 Evidence Amendment Act 2 of 1980, s 23. 
173 R v Vinette [1975] 2 SCR 222; R v Davis [1980] 1 NZLR 257 (CA) at 262; R v Kirkby [2000] 2 QR 57 
(QCA).  
174 Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Volume 1, 1999) 234 & 235. 
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criminal justice system policy, namely, that a criminal court is the arena for the imposition of 
serious punishments.
175
 
The LRC went on to propose solutions and stipulated that the criminal court judgement 
evidence reflecting a conviction should be accepted in successive criminal proceedings as 
well.176 The LRC further stipulated that the party that intends to adduce such evidence will 
have to show beforehand the relevance of such evidence in the present matter.
177
 
4.2.2.3 Section 49 of the Evidence Act 2006 
The Evidence Act came into force in 2006 and finally settled the uncertainties in accordance 
with the recommendations of the LRC. This Act introduced section 49 which is to date still 
applicable in New Zealand. This section provides that a conviction as reflected in a criminal 
court judgement will suffice as conclusive proof that a party concerned has committed the 
said crime. This section further stipulates that in certain compelling circumstances the 
presiding officer may permit the party against whom such evidence is produced to adduce 
evidence to disprove such conviction.
178
 
In conclusion, the judgement evidence is admissible in later civil proceedings in terms of 
section 23 of the Evidence Amendment Act and this followed the abolition of the Hollington 
rule by the courts on their own. The courts did not end there but took it upon themselves to 
further extend that application to criminal proceedings and the legislature caught up and 
enacted section 49 of the Evidence Act to give effect to the courts‘ approach. 
4.2.3 Australia 
The legal position before the legislative enactment against the rule in Hollington in Australia 
is reflected in Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint.179 The Court dealt with the position of 
criminal court judgements as evidence in later civil suits in Australia. The Court held that 
such evidence was admissible as prima facie proof. This means that a party intending to rebut 
that judgement evidence will only be allowed to do so upon tendering fresh evidence that 
altered the aspect of the case completely.180  
                                                            
175 Law Commission Evidence report, para 233. 
176 Law Commission Evidence report, para 234. 
177 Law Commission Evidence report, para 235. 
178 Evidence Act 2006, s 49. 
179 Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365. 
180 Mickelberg case, at 372. 
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4.2.3.1 Evidence Act 1995 
The Evidence Act
181
 was enacted to, among other things, abolish the Hollington rule in 
Australia. Specifically, part 3.5 of that Act introduced sections 91-93 which provisions 
abolish the Hollington rule. Section 91 at face value retains the Hollington rule and provides 
that the judgement evidence or a fact finding reflected in that judgement evidence as per the 
conclusions of the previous court will be inadmissible in successive proceedings.182 The 
operation of section 91 is qualified by section 92(2) which provides that the conviction may 
be used as evidence in successive proceedings despite the prescripts of section 91.
183
 Section 
92(2) further permits the admissibility of the evidence of convictions despite the prescripts of 
section 59
184
, which deny the admissibility of hearsay evidence, and of section 76
185
 which 
deny the admissibility of opinion evidence.186 
                                                            
181 Evidence Act 1995. 
182 Evidence Act 1995, s91. – 
  ‗(1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is 
 not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. 
(2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to 
prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose. 
Note: Section 178 (Convictions, acquittals and other judicial proceedings) provides for  
certificate evidence of decisions. 
183 Evidence Act 1995, s 92. – 
‗(1) Subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence of the grant of  probate, letters 
of administration or a similar order of a court to prove: 
  (a) the death, or date of death, of a person; or 
  (b) the due execution of a testamentary document. 
(2) In a civil proceeding, subsection 91(1) does not prevent the admission or use of evidence  that a 
party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence, not being a 
conviction: 
(a) in respect of which a review or appeal (however described) has been instituted but not 
finally determined; or 
(b)    that has been quashed or set aside; or 
(c)    in respect of which a pardon has been given. 
(3) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a kind referred to in this Section.‘ 
 
184 Evidence Act 1995, s 59. – 
 ‗(1) Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the  
existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the 
representation. 
(2) Such a fact is in this Part referred to as an asserted fact. 
(2A) For the purposes of determining under subsection (1) whether it can reasonably be supposed that 
the person intended to assert a particular fact by the representation, the court may have regard to the 
circumstances in which the representation was made. 
Note: Subsection (2A) was inserted as a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of NSW in R. v 
Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359. 
(1) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of a representation contained in a  
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The Court in Gonzales v Claridades187 stated that the Hollington rule was originally 
formulated based on the understanding that the judgement evidence was either hearsay or 
opinion evidence and therefore inadmissible in successive proceedings. The Court went on to 
state that that conclusion was based on the logic that the accused‘s guilty verdict was a 
representation made elsewhere and not in the course of the later civil law suit in which such 
evidence was intended to be adduced. Most importantly, the Court also stated that had it not 
been for the existence of section 92 of the Evidence Act in New South Wales, the judgement 
evidence would be excluded as hearsay or opinion evidence. The Court confirmed that 
section 92 indeed abolished the Hollington rule in civil suits and that the burden was on the 
party who challenged the correctness of the conviction tendered as evidence to prove that it 
was indeed incorrect. It was also stated that once conviction evidence was admitted in terms 
of section 92, it was not conclusive as regards the effect of estoppel since the party against 
whom it was adduced would be allowed to contest it.
188
 
In a further extension of the scope of section 92, the Court in National Mutual Life 
Association of Australasia Ltd v Grosvenor Hill
189
 ruled that the judgements of the superior 
courts can be adduced as evidence in proving the parties‘ identity in later civil law suits. The 
court also stated that such evidence can also be used in proving the issue that was raised in 
those initial proceedings as reflected in the judgement.
190
 
The courts further shed light on section 92. In Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales v Sukkar
191
 the Court held that a certificate obtained in terms of the relevant 
provisions of the Evidence Act that furnishes proof of the truthfulness of the facts the 
conviction was based on could be admissible. The Court stated that that statement was 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
certificate or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than this Act to 
the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other document has evidentiary 
effect.‘ 
185 Evidence Act 1995, s 76. – ‗(1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact 
about the 
existence of which the opinion was expressed. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to evidence of an opinion contained in a certificate 
or other document given or made under regulations made under an Act other than 
this Act to the extent to which the regulations provide that the certificate or other 
document has evidentiary effect.‘ 
186 Evidence Act 1995, ss 59, 76 & 92. 
187 Gonzales v Claridades (2003) 58 NSWLR 188. 
188 Gonzales v Claridades case, para 66. 
189 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 
190 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd case, para 46 – 51. 
191 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341. 
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unfortunately inadmissible insofar as it purported to show the truthfulness of the facts 
because section 91 militates against such evidence.192 
The Court in Ainsworth v Burden
193
 clarified the position in Prothonotary of the Supreme 
Court, and stated that when the content of the previous judgement has relevance in successive 
proceedings in which it is adduced, it will be admissible as long as it does not purport to 
prove the truthfulness of that material. The Court stated that an example of an instance in 
which the content of the judgement may be admissible is when the content is adduced to 
prove that the party that has read the findings therein has knowledge of that content. The 
Court cited section 91 as an impediment to the admission of the statement that seeks to prove 
the truthfulness of the content of the judgement evidence.194 
In Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd v Michkoroudny
195
 the defendant was initially convicted 
of having wrongfully used the information he obtained during his employment by the 
applicant. The Court held that that conviction was admissible as evidence that proves that the 
defendant had indeed committed that wrong.196 In defamation proceedings, the Court of 
Appeal in Bass v TCN Channel Nine
197
 admitted a finding previously arrived at by the jury, 
namely that the plaintiff had acted fraudulently. The Court stated that such a finding was 
relevant to the plaintiff‘s credibility in a subsequent civil law suit. The Court relied on section 
93 which provides the principle of estoppel and halts the application of the res judicata 
principle
198
 
4.2.3.2 Acquittals 
In Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett
199
 the Court held that the acquittal of a mentally ill 
defendant on the basis of limited legal capacity was not admissible to found an estoppel 
pertaining to that party‘s mental illness.200 In the context of acquittals the application of the 
Hollington rule is still intact and has not been changed by the Evidence Act. In Helton v 
                                                            
192 Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341, para 9; see also an 
unreported case of Antoniadis v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (12/3/97, NSWSC) para 2–4. 
193 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 
194 Ainsworth v Burden case, para 109. 
195 Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd v Michkoroudny [2006] NSWSC 280. 
196 Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd case, para 4. 
197 Bass v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 343. 
198 Bass v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 343, para 21 – 24. 
199 Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220. 
200 Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Gillett (2004) 145 A Crim R 220, para 38–41; Batey v Potts (2004) 61 NSWLR 
274 para 8–13. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
46 
 
Allen
201
 it was concluded that acquittals are not admissible in successive civil suits.
202
 The 
Court of Appeal in Pringle v Everingham
203
 stated that the Evidence Act did not change the 
common law position that was originally formulated in the Hollington case in the context of 
acquittals.204 
4.2.4 The United States of America (USA) 
In the USA the admissibility of judgement evidence is governed by Rules of evidence. These 
Rules are referred to as Federal Evidence Rules.
205
 These rules were originally enacted in 
1975 by the US Congress following numerous years of drafting by the US highest court, the 
Supreme Court.206 The most relevant of these Federal Evidence Rules in the context of this 
chapter is Rule 609. This Rule deals with the use of convictions of the criminal courts as 
evidence for impeachment in later civil proceedings. It is at the disposal of the parties that 
seek to attack the character of the witnesses for truthfulness.207 
                                                            
201 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691. 
202 Helton case, para 710. 
203 Pringle v Everingham [2006] NSWCA 195. 
204 Pringle case, para 34. 
205 US Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975. 
206 The National Court Rules Committee ‗Federal Rules of Evidence‘ available at: 
https://www.rulesofevidence.org/ (Accessed 10 October 2018); see also Spirn A.R ‗Prior Conviction Evidence‘ 
(1986) 86 CLR 1269. 
207 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609. – ―(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness‘s 
character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: 
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more 
than one year, the evidence: 
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is 
not a defendant; and 
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant; and 
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily 
determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving — or the witness‘s admitting — a 
dishonest act or false statement. 
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years.  
This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness‘s conviction or release from 
confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if: 
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect; and 
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party 
has a fair opportunity to contest its use. 
(c) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation.  
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This Rule provides that a criminal offence that is punishable by more than one year of 
imprisonment or by death in the jurisdiction where it was imposed will constitute a criminal 
conviction which is admissible in later civil or criminal litigation for purposes of Rule 609. 
The court must, upon admission of that evidence, be satisfied that its probative value exceeds 
the prejudicial effects it may have on the party against whom it has been adduced.  It is also 
stated that notwithstanding the extent of the punishment, the evidence of conviction will be 
admissible if the court is able to determine that such evidence is establishing the elements of 
crime needed to prove dishonesty.208 
The Supreme Court, in Green v. Bock Laundry,
209
 stated that Rule 609 obliges a presiding 
officer to allow a witness‘s impeachment in later civil suits with evidence of a criminal court 
judgement. The Court explained that such evidence will be tendered despite any unfair 
prejudices that may possibly ensue from it.210 
4.3 Conclusion 
The foregoing jurisdictions have long abolished the application of the Hollington rule. Why is 
South African jurisprudence showing a firm trend of hesitation to do the same? South Africa 
jurisdiction may draw from the methods used by the foregoing jurisdictions in order to allow 
the litigants to freely rely on the judicial precedent established in earlier cases. The 
Hollington rule is an impediment to the principle of stare decisis and judicial precedent, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if: 
(1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has not been 
convicted of a later crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year; or 
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is admissible under this rule only if: 
(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant; 
(3) an adult‘s conviction for that offense would be admissible to attack the adult‘s credibility; and 
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of an Appeal. A conviction that satisfies this rule is admissible even if an appeal is pending. 
Evidence of the pendency is also admissible.‖ 
208 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609. 
209 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989). 
210 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) pp 509 – 527. 
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that, as has been shown above, it denies reliance by the parties on court judgements that have 
been decided already.
 211
 Chapter 5 will suggest how the rule in Hollington can be abolished, 
which body has the authority to do so, and on what basis to abolish it. 
 
  
                                                            
211 Graham v Park Mews Body Corporate and Another [2012] 1 All SA 167 (WCC) para 60; De Sousa and 
Another v Technology Corporate Management (Proprietary) Limited and Others [2017] 3 All SA 47 (GJ) para 
107. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
OPINION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically outlines the rule in Hollington as permitted by section 42 of the CPEA. 
This rule is analysed in the light of section 17 of the CPEA, section 3 of the LEAA,
212
 and 
finally sections 39 (2) and 173 of the South African Constitution.
213
 Finally, light will be shed 
on how the issue of criminal court judgement admissibility as evidence in civil proceedings 
should be dealt with in South Africa. To that end this chapter considers, among other things, 
the courts‘ constitutional duties. Further duties imposed on courts by other legislation are also 
outlined owing to their relevance. 
5.2 Proposed Solutions on the rule in Hollington  
In this section this dissertation will contribute viable and legally founded solutions to abolish 
or circumvent the rule in Hollington in South Africa. This circumvention will be proposed in 
terms of the CPEA, LEAA and Constitution respectively.  
5.2.1 Admission of Judgement Evidence by Way of an Application of Section 17 of 
the CPEA 
Scholars
214
 and the courts, as has been shown in earlier chapters, are united in the view that it 
is section 42 of the CPEA that instructs the courts to incorporate into South African law the 
English law, particularly the rule in Hollington.
215
 The courts seem to uphold this view and 
have consistently held themselves bound by this rule based on the contention that they are 
forced to apply it by section 42.
216
 Those views now necessitate scrutiny of section 42. This 
section provides that the law of evidence that applied on 30 May 1961 will apply in any case 
                                                            
212 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
213 Constitution of the Reoublic of South Africa, 1996 ss 39(2) & 173. 
214 Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe S Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) 313; See also Zeffertt DT & Paizes 
The South African Evidence 2ed (2009) 341 – 343; Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited‘ 
(1970) 87 SALJ 344 – 337; Davids J ‗Judgment as Evidence‘ (1968) 85 SALJ 78 -79. See further the 
contribution of made by the scholars from other jurisdiction that were similarly bound by the rule in Hollington: 
Spencer JR ‗The Ghost of The Rule In Hollington v Hewthorn Exorcist Required‘ (2014) 73 CLJ 477; Wright 
CA ‗Evidence-Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Civil Actions – Hearsay‘ (1943) 21 CBR 658. 
215 See for example Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe S Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) 110 – 111; Prophet v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC) at footnote 26 & para 42. 
216 Groenewald N.O and Another v Swanepoel 2002 (6) SA 724 (E) At 727E see also S v Khanyapa 1979 (1) SA 
824 (A); S v Mavuso 1987 (3) SA 499 (A); Society of Advocates of South Africa (Witwatersrand Division) v 
Rottanburg 1984 (4) SA 35 (T) where the courts confirmed that the Hollington case and the precedent laid down 
in it is binding on the South African courts. 
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that is not covered by the CPEA or any other law. It is important to note that with this clause 
the legislature specifically anticipated those cases not provided for by the South African law 
not just any cases. As has been shown in chapter 2, the law relating to the admissibility of 
conviction evidence in civil suits was the one found in the 1943 judgement, the Hollington 
case, according to which the conviction evidence was inadmissible in later civil proceedings. 
Section 17 of the CPEA provides that a conviction or an acquittal may be proved by the 
production of a document duly certified by the relevant court that acquitted or convicted the 
person in question. This provision permits, or at least should be read and understood as 
permitting, the use of criminal convictions and acquittals as conclusive evidence in civil 
proceedings. Section 42 of the CPEA provides that when the CPEA is silent on a specific 
issue the courts are required to find answers in the English law that was applicable on 30 May 
1960.
217
 Section 17 of the CPEA provides that the judgement evidence is admissible is civil 
proceedings.
218
 Sections 42 read with, and in the light of, section 17 leaves no room for the 
application of the English law that was in force on 30 May 1961 because the CPEA is not 
silent on the admissibility of a criminal judgement in civil proceedings. 
The law as it stands in South Africa reflects the courts‘ disregard of section 17. Alternatively, 
the South African law as it stands is reflective of a misinterpretation of section 42. This 
possible misinterpretation is based on the reason that section 42 grants the courts a discretion 
to choose between the South African law and the English law of evidence when deciding 
certain matters. After rigorous research I have not been able to find any judgement in which 
section 17 was quoted, interpreted and whose relevance was examined and decided. This 
dissertation contends that the courts have erroneously integrated the ancient English law into 
the South African law against the prescripts of the South African law itself. There is therefore 
no need for the enactment of new legislation to abolish the rule in Hollington in South Africa 
because section 17 of the CPEA is readily available. 
                                                            
217 CPEA, s 42. – ‗The law of evidence including the law relating to the competency, compellability, 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses which was in force in respect of civil proceedings on the 
thirtieth day of May, 1961, shall apply in any case not provided for by this Act or any other law.‘ 
218 CPEA, s 17. – ‗The trial and conviction or acquittal of any person may be proved by the production of a  
document certified or purporting to be certified by the registrar or clerk of the court or other officer having the 
custody of the records of the court where such conviction or acquittal took place, or by the deputy of such 
registrar, clerk or other officer, to be a copy of the record of the charge and of the trial, conviction and judgment 
or acquittal, as the case may be, omitting the formal parts thereof.‘ 
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5.2.2 Admission of Judgement Evidence by Way of Statutory Exceptions to  the 
Hearsay Rule 
It has been submitted that a criminal court judgement tendered as evidence in later civil 
proceedings becomes hearsay evidence although that was not explicitly stated in the 
Hollington case.
219
 It has been further contended that based on the wording of the Hollington 
judgement the hearsay rule is what the Court had in mind when it refused the admission of 
judgement evidence.
220
 The South African law as it stands defines hearsay as evidence 
whether in oral or written form whose probative value depends on the credibility of a person 
other than the one adducing it.
221
 By the same definition a judgement is in writing and its 
probative value depends on the credibility of the presiding officer that delivered it and not the 
plaintiff who is now adducing it in the civil court. Before 1988, it has been submitted, there 
were no clear exceptions in terms of which to admit hearsay evidence save for undefended 
cases.
222
 This could be the reason why the courts were reluctant to admit the judgement 
evidence. 
In 1988, the legislature enacted the LEAA, including section 3 which introduced the 
exceptions to hearsay rule.
223
 The general rule is that hearsay is not admissible evidence both 
in criminal and civil proceedings.
224
 Section 3 provides three exceptions in terms of which 
hearsay evidence may be admitted contrary to the general rule. This provision provides that 
                                                            
219 Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 332 
220 Thomas H & Davis IV ‗Criminal Judgments as Evidence in Civil Cases‘ (1957) 11 SwLJ 231; see further 
Wright CA ‗Evidence-Admissibility of Criminal Convictions In Civil Actions – Hearsay‘ (1943) 21 CBR 657. 
221 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 s 3(4). – ‗For the purposes of this section "hearsay evidence" 
means evidence: whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any 
person other than the person giving such evidence.‘ 
222 Zeffer DT ‗The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Revisited‘ (1970) 87 SALJ 335. 
223 LEAA, s 3. – ‗(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as 
evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless- 
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof as evidence at such 
proceedings; 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, himself testifies at such 
proceedings; or 
(c) the court, having regard to- 
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence;  
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence;. . . 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative value 
 of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account, 
 is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.‘ 
224 LEAA, s 3 (1). 
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hearsay evidence may be admissible by consent between the litigants
225
 and the courts have 
held that consent will be inferred from the opponent party‘s failure to object to its 
admissibility.
226
 It was also provided that consent will be inferred in instances where a litigant 
purposefully provokes hearsay evidence from their opponents during cross-examination.
227
 
The second instance according to which hearsay evidence may be admissible occurs when it 
may be admitted provisionally when the court has been informed that the party on whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends will be available to testify at some 
later stage.
228
 Thirdly and most importantly, section 3 (1) (c) grants upon the courts a judicial 
discretion to admit hearsay evidence when they are satisfied that doing so is in the interest of 
justice. This provision assists the courts with six specific considerations and an additional one 
that is wider than the rest that the courts may consider when they are exercising their 
discretion in admitting hearsay evidence. The courts are, in terms of subparagraph (i), to 
consider the nature of the proceedings, and in terms of subparagraph (ii) to consider the nature 
of the evidence. Having indicated that section 3 applies to both criminal and civil matters, it 
cannot be over-emphasised that civil courts also have it at their disposal.
229
 As has been 
shown in chapter 1 of this dissertation, the criminal law standard of proof is heavier than in 
civil proceedings. In the application of subparagraph (i) the nature of litigation is civil 
proceedings where the standard of proof is less than that employed in criminal proceedings. In 
the application of subparagraph (ii) the nature of the evidence is a criminal court conviction 
that was arrived at using a standard of proof that is more onerous than that which would 
otherwise be used in the civil court if the matter was to be re-litigated. 
Proceeding with the considerations in section 3 (1) (c), subparagraph (iii) requires the courts 
to consider the purpose for which the evidence is tendered, and subparagraph (iv) draws the 
courts‘ attention to consider the probative value of such evidence.230 The courts have also 
pronounced on section 3 of the LEAA. In Vimbela v S the court relied on section 3 of the 
LEAA to allow the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
231
 In May v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accident Fund the Court cited the hearsay definition found in section 3 of the LEAA.
232
 The 
                                                            
225LEAA, s 3 (1) (a). 
226 S v Aspeling 1998 (1) SACR 561 (C); Thoroughbred Breeders Association of South Africa v Price 
Waterhouse 1999 (4) SA 968 (W). 
227 See for example the case of Mahomed v Attorney-General of Natal & others 1996 (1) SACR 139 (N). 
228 LEAA s 3 (1) (b). 
229LEAA s 3 (1) (c) (i) – (ii). 
230 LEAA s 3 (1) (c) (iii) – (iv). 
231 Vimbela v S [2015] JOL 31805 (GP), page 3. 
232 May v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund [2008] JOL 22337 (Ck), page 5. 
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Court further stated that a statement made by someone other than the one giving it in court 
did not automatically become hearsay evidence.
233
 The Court stated that it is when that 
statement is adduced as evidence that it becomes hearsay evidence.
234
 
Applying the former subparagraph, the purpose of tendering the judgement evidence is to 
avoid unnecessary litigation costs and endless re-litigation of the same matter in different 
courts. Furthermore, the purpose of tendering judgement evidence is based on the reliance on 
the judicial precedent and the doctrine of finality of litigation as the matter has already been 
pronounced on. Applying the latter subparagraph, the judgement of the criminal court is 
anticipated to have a sufficiently persuasive value to that of the civil court when the criminal 
court has a similar or inferior status. However, the judgement evidence is anticipated in this 
dissertation to be conclusive when the criminal court whose judgement is tendered in the civil 
court has a status superior to that of the civil court. This view is correctly in conformity with 
the doctrine of stare decisis and judicial precedent.
235
 Based on this line of reasoning, by 
eliminating this mere technicality of the Hollington rule, it would be unacceptable to hold that 
a criminal court judgement lacks all probative value in a civil court. 
According to subparagraph (v) courts are expected to consider the reason why the party on 
whose credibility the probative value of the hearsay evidence depends is not available to 
testify in the proceedings. Moreover, subparagraph (vi) requires of the courts to consider any 
prejudice associated with the admission of such hearsay evidence.
236
 Applying the former 
provision, the judges‘ complaint is one of overwork and backlogs, meaning that judges are 
State employees whose responsibilities are demanding.
237
 It is therefore impracticable for 
them to appear as witnesses with regard to their own judgements in later civil suits. It is not 
desirable for a judge to appear before a civil court bench to testify about her judgement, 
because the courts are special public bodies tasked with the duty of decision-making.
238
 The 
foregoing are sound reasons why, upon the production of judgement evidence before a civil 
court, the judges cannot be readily available to testify about their judgements. Applying the 
                                                            
233 May v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund case, page 5. 
234 May v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund case, page 5. 
235 Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re: S v Walters and Another 2002 (7) BCLR 663 
(C) at 693; Barratt A & Snyman P ‗Researching South African Law‘ Available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa1.html#_edn14 (Accessed 23 February 2018). 
236 LEAA s 3 (1) (c) (v)-(vi). 
237 News24 ‗Western Cape High Court backlog getting worse‘ Available at: 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/western-cape-high-court-backlog-getting-worse-20180903 
(Accessed 13 November 2018). 
238 Spencer JR ‗The Ghost of the Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Exorcist Required‘ (2014) 73 CLJ 477. 
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latter subparagraph, when the judgement evidence is dismissed, as is presently the case in 
South Africa, the party who relies on that evidence will suffer the cost related to the litigation, 
including possible legal costs.
239
 Finding the initial witnesses for the second time long after 
the incident might be difficult or impossible due to their death or incapacity. The reliance on 
judicial precedent will fail the litigants and benefit the wrongdoers for their misdeeds.
240
 The 
foregoing are inevitable prejudices ensuing from the rejection of the judgement evidence.  
The last provision of section 3 (1) (c) contains a very wide, yet flexible, consideration which 
the courts may employ in deciding whether or not to admit hearsay evidence. That 
consideration is to be found in subparagraph (vii), and provides that the courts may, in 
addition to the other considerations, take into account any other factor that they deem 
necessary. All these considerations must guide the courts towards the admission of hearsay 
evidence on the grounds that such admission is in the interest of justice. This is a guideline 
offered by this dissertation as a means to circumvent of the rule in Hollington in South Africa 
by reliance on the LEAA. 
  
                                                            
239 Shymka ER ‗Hollington v Hewthorn in Canada‘ (1955) 174 ALR 183- 184. 
240 Osew EA ‗The Criminal in the Civil Court‘ (1970) 2 RGL 94-97. 
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5.2.3 Circumvention of the Rule in Hollington through the Development of 
the Common Law in Terms of the Constitution 
The enactment of new legislation as a means to finally lay the rule in Hollington to rest is 
unnecessary. The judiciary has, to my knowledge and as has been submitted by 
Schwikkard,
241
 not yet pronounced on the relevance and the effects of section 17 of the CPEA 
on the rule in Hollington. Should courts adopt the interpretation that is offered by Schwikkard 
in relation to section 17, and should the exceptions to the hearsay rule as shown above fail, the 
Constitution may still be opted for as a final resort.
242
 South African courts may make use of 
the Constitution and develop the common law in terms of the prescripts of section 173 read 
with section 39(2) thereof.
243
 Section 39(2) bestows on the courts the power to develop the 
common law while on the other hand section 173 explains the nature of that power the courts 
are anticipated to exercise. Section 173 provides that it is the power inherent in the superior 
courts namely the High Court, the SCA and the Constitutional Court.
244
 The superior courts 
may, as expected of them, accept the duty to develop the common law using sections 173 and 
39(2) of the Constitution by finally putting an end to the rule in Hollington. 
Courts have pronounced on the development of the common law and laid down guidelines 
that courts ought to be followed in this regard. The Constitutional Court in Paulsen and 
Another v Slip Knot Investments ruled that when policy does not permit the development of 
the common law the courts must likewise refrain from doing so.
245
 The Court took the view 
that if the courts ignore the public policy consideration test and readily leap to develop the 
common law, they will run the risk of usurping the function of the legislative authority, 
thereby breaching the doctrine of separation of powers.
246
 In Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security the Constitutional Court held that the judiciary, when it is exercising the power 
bestowed on it by the Constitution to develop the common law, must remain cognisantof the 
fact that legislative authority rests primarily with the legislature.
247
 The highest court in South 
Africa, the Constitutional Court, again in the case of Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another stated that courts are mandated by section 39(2) of the 
                                                            
241 Schwikkard PJ & Van der Merwe S Principles of Evidence 4ed (2016) 313. 
242 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
243 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 39 (2) & 173. 
244 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 173. - ‗The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the 
common law, taking into account the interests of justice.‘ 
245 Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Limited [2015] ZACC 5 para 57. 
246 Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot Investments case at para 57. 
247 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 36. 
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Constitution to develop the common law. However, courts must exercise their power 
sparingly in those cases that demand the development of the common law because law reform 
falls within the terrain of the legislature.
248
 The Constitutional Court, after ruling that public 
policy must be determinative in the development of the common law, went on to hold that 
public policy considerations are infused in the constitutional values. Those considerations 
may, according to the Court, compete so much that it becomes difficulty to make a choice but 
it is erroneous of the court to opt for its preferred choice that is arrived at without weighing 
those considerations.
249
  
The rule in Hollington as it has been demonstrated in chapter 3 of this dissertation offends and 
stands out to compete and conflict with the common law doctrine of de bloedige hand neemt 
geen erf which doctrine serves to advance the legitimate demands of public policy. The 
Hollington rule defeats the bloedige hand rule and renders it useless in that it makes it 
difficult for it to achieve the very purpose for which it was intended to prevent wrongdoers 
from benefitting from their transgressions.
250
 In a further assessment of why the common law 
should be developed, the rule in Hollington unjustly obstructs and militates against the long 
established principles that create the necessary order in a legal system. Those principles are 
stare decisis and judicial precedent.
251
 The Hollington rule unreasonably puts these principles 
in abeyance. The rule in Hollington translates to: that when a superior court hands down a 
judgement in terms of which an accused person is found guilty as charged and then convicted, 
such conviction will not bind on the inferior courts such as a Magistrate‘s Court.  
In criminal matters the State is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable 
doubt,
252
 while, on the other hand, in civil proceedings the litigants are only required to 
establish a prima facie case against each other.
253
 The rule in Hollington requires the matter 
to be started afresh in the civil proceedings, and to be proved on a balance of probabilities, a 
standard which is lighter than the one used when the matter was first proved in the criminal 
court. This state of affairs militates against logic and common sense, and it is irreconcilable 
for trading a stronger standard of proof for the lighter one.  The Hollington rule can hardly be 
said to align with the public policy that is reflected in the spirit of the Constitution, taking 
                                                            
248 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) para 31. 
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into account the prejudices and disadvantages it comes with as outlined in this dissertation. It 
is of necessity, and the public policy of today demands, that the rule in Hollington be 
abolished.
254
  
The superior courts can now develop the common law, and doing so will not amount to an 
encroachment upon the domain of the legislature as the latter has long ago resolved this issue 
by the enactment of section 17 of the CPEA in 1965. The Hollington rule is further in conflict 
with and disturbing the doctrine of finality in proceedings;
255
 and abolishing it cannot be said 
to be unnecessary in the circumstance because it is a liability in our law in that it has more 
prejudices and disadvantages than benefits. This rule does not only hamstring the litigants 
with litigation costs but also obstructs other essential legal principles thereby causing chaos 
and uncertainty in our legal system. In the light of these considerations, the light is green for 
the South African courts to employ sections 39 (2) and 173 of the Constitution and develop 
the common law with regard to the rule in Hollington. This will certainly restore legal 
certainty and resolve the undesirable conflicts and competition among South African legal 
principles. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The rule in Hollington originated in England in 1943 in Hollington v Hewthorn and it dictates 
that a criminal court judgement is inadmissible as evidence in later civil proceedings because 
it is an opinion of a criminal court judge. This rule was incorporated into South African law 
by reference in terms of section 42 of the CPEA. In England the rule was abolished with the 
enactment of the Civil Evidence Act in 1968. Be that as it may, to date it remains part of 
South African law. It has been criticised by legal scholars at both the local and international 
levels. In other jurisdictions steps have been taken to finally lay it to rest. This dissertation 
has argued that it can be abolished in one of the three ways namely: the interpretation of 
section 17 of the CPEA in a manner that abolishes the Hollington rule; secondly, the LEAA 
should be used as a means to admit the judgement evidence as an exception to the hearsay 
rule; and thirdly, courts can make use of the Constitution, particularly section 39(2) and 
section 173, and embark on the development of the common law. It is only when one of these 
avenues is employed that legal certainty will be restored and the conflict of legal principles 
will be resolved in the South African legal system. 
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